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Interracial Marriage and the Original
Understanding of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause
by DAVID R. UPHAM*
It has been the common belief that the chief purpose and effect of the last two
amendments to the Federal Constitution were to clothe the negro with the same
civil rights that are enjoyed by white citizens ... But there is little doubt that
[the Slaughter-House Cases] will greatly restrict the operation of the fourteenth
amendment, as the purpose and effect of that amendment have been popularly
understood . . . Inferior courts have declared that laws preventing the
intermarriage of blacks and whites do not make an unconstitutional
discrimination against color, and such statutes are in force in some of the States.!
A perennial objection to the constitutional theory known as
"originalism" is its alleged inconsistency with the result in Loving v.
Virginia.2  Judicial and scholarly critics have often cited this
inconsistency as a leading argument against what one court called the
"rigid, originalist view of constitutional interpretation."3  One
prominent critic has insisted that "constitutional protection of
interracial marriage" is simply incompatible with the "original
* Associate Professor of Politics, University of Dallas; J.D., University of Texas
School of Law; Ph.D., University of Dallas. I am very grateful for comments offered, on
an initial draft of this article, by Andrew Hyman, Professor Jack Balkin, and the many
distinguished scholars who attended the Originalism Works-in-Progress Conference in
February 2014.
1. Editorial, Jury Rights of Colored Citizens, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1879, at 4,
available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=FAOBlEF7395A137B93C
4AB178FD85F4D8784F9 (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).
2. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
3. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 805, n.20 (9th Cir. 1996) (en
banc) (Reinhardt, J.) (citing the Loving precedent as the first argument against such a
"rigid" originalism), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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expected application" of the Fourteenth Amendment.4  Many
scholars have concurred!
Most notably, the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey6 relied chiefly on Loving to resist the "tempting" view that the
Fourteenth Amendment should be interpreted consistent with its
original understanding:
Marriage is mentioned nowhere in the Bill of Rights
and interracial marriage was illegal in most States in
the 19th century, but the Court was no doubt correct
in finding it to be an aspect of liberty protected against
state interference by the substantive component of the
Due Process Clause in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1,
12 (1967).'
In recent years, this alleged deficiency has supported the so-called
"Loving analogy.,8 According to several courts (prompted by the
4. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENTARY 291,
297 (2007).
5. See, e.g., SAMUEL A. MARCOSSON, ORIGINAL SIN: CLARENCE THOMAS AND
THE FAILURE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSERVATIVES 15-20 (2002) (preparing a
mock dissenting opinion that Justice Thomas would have written in Loving had he been
on the Court and faithful to his "staunch originalist" reading). See also this satirical
"news" piece that I was credulous enough to initially consider authentic: Brent Youngren,
Justice Thomas Declares His Own Marriage Unconstitutional, FREE WOOD POST (Mar. 29,
2012), http://www.freewoodpost.com/2012103/29/j ustice-thomas-declares-his-own-marriage
-unconstitutional/ ("reporting" that Justice Thomas conceded in an interview that he
"probably would have voted to uphold Virginia's Racial Integrity Act of 1924"); Thomas
B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 774 (2011) (stating that
the result in Loving was not compelled by "the plain, objective, unambiguous meaning of
the text of the Privileges or Immunities Clause"); Bret Boyce, Originalism and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 909, 996 (1998) (concluding that "the
public understanding of the Amendment expressed by its originators" was consistent with
state racial-endogamy laws); William P. Marshall, Progressive Constitutionalism,
Originalism, and the Significance of Landmark Decisions in Evaluating Constitutional
Theory, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1202, 1259 n.54 (2011); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism,
and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1920
(1995); RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY,
AND ADOPTION 252 (2012) (arguing that "[t]he historical record strongly indicates that
the politicians who framed the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend for it to render
illegal statutes prohibiting interracial marriage").
6. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-48 (1992).
7. Id.; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (stating that "neither
history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional
attack").
8. As of November 2012, the Lexis database includes 90 law review articles that use
this term; most of these articles have appeared in the last ten years. See, e.g., William N.
[Vol. 42:2
Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Windsor),9 just as Loving
properly disregarded the original understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment by invalidating laws prohibiting marriage between
persons of different races, courts today should likewise set aside
historical understandings to invalidate laws inhibiting marriage
between persons of the same sex."'
In response to the criticism, some have offered an originalist
defense of Loving, but many originalists (and other conservative
jurists) have agreed that the proponents of the Fourteenth
Amendment believed it would not affect racial-endogamy laws."
Perhaps the most cited originalist authority is Alfred Avins's
extensive 1966 study that affirmed that no one in the 39th Congress
(which framed the Amendment) "seriously thought that these state
laws were within the pale of the amendment's prohibitions."12 More
recently, a prominent originalist-and co-founder of the Federalist
Society-has baldly asserted as "fact that the Reconstruction Framers
Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419, 1504-05 & n.290
(1993).
9. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013) (citing Loving as a
restriction on the states' otherwise "virtually exclusive" authority to regulate marriage).
10. See, e.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1210 (10th Cir. 2014) (relying on
Casey's characterization of Loving as contrary to history and tradition); Bostic v. Schaefer,
760 F.3d 352, 376 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Loving as vindicating an "expansive liberty
interest that may stretch to accommodate changing societal norms").
11. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888 389 n.143 (1985) (citing similar conclusions of Alexander
Bickel, Raoul Berger, and Alfred Avins). The state of Virginia relied heavily on this
historical claim in Loving: "[A]n analysis of the legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment conclusively establishes the clear understanding-both of the legislators who
framed and adopted the Amendment and the legislatures which ratified it-that the
Fourteenth Amendment had no application whatever to the anti-miscegenation statutes of
the various States and did not interfere in any way with the power of the States to adopt
such statutes. The precise question was specifically considered by the framers of the
Amendment, and a clear intent to exclude such statutes from the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment was repeatedly made manifest." Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, Brief and
Appendix on Behalf of Appellee, in 16 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 794, 798 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper
eds., 1975).
12. Alfred Avins, Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Fourteenth Amendment: The
Original Intent, 52 VA. L. REV. 1224, 1253 (1966). Even more categorically, at oral
argument Virginia's attorney in Loving asserted that, "for over one hundred years since
the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, numerous states.. . have been exercising this
power without any question being raised as to the authority of the States to exercise this
power." Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, Oral Argument of R.D. Mcllwaine III, Esq., on
Behalf of Appellee, in 16 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 11, at 976,
1000 (emphasis added).
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expected their laws to be consistent with.., bans on racial
intermarriage."3
This article seeks to challenge this widespread belief by an
analysis of abundant and significant historic evidence-most of which
has not been considered by contemporary legal scholars.4 The article
will proceed in four parts, corresponding to the following conclusions:
(1) that before the Amendment, most (but not all) authorities
concluded that such laws abridged a pre-existing right recognized at
common law, which represented a privilege of citizenship; (2) that
during the adoption of the Amendment, both proponents and
opponents generally (though not unanimously) declared,
acknowledged, or conspicuously failed to deny, that the Amendment
would invalidate such laws; (3) that contra the Supreme Court's claim
in Casey (and the argument of Virginia's attorneys in Loving), within
five years of the Amendment's ratification, racial-endogamy laws
were either non-existent or unenforced in a clear majority of the
states, in large part because Republican officials-including virtually
every Republican judge to face the question-concluded that African
Americans' constitutional entitlement to the status and privileges of
citizenship precluded the making or enforcing of such laws; and (4)
that the contrary holdings were made by Democratic judges hostile to
Reconstruction, whose hostility was frequently manifest in their
implausible interpretations of the Amendment. The article will
conclude with reflections on how the Supreme Court's decision in the
Slaughter-House Cases5 dealt a serious blow to the Amendment's
original meaning and thus facilitated the renewed making and
enforcing of these laws. This history will prove, by a strong
preponderance of the evidence, that the Fourteenth Amendment, as
13. Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism and Loving v. Virginia,
2012 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1393, 1398 (emphasis added). Still, Matthews and Calabresi argue
that the Amendment's original expected non-application was inconsistent with its original
public meaning. Id. See also Hadley Arkes, A Natural Law Manifesto or an Appeal from
the Old Jurisprudence to the New, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1245, 1263 (2012) (asserting
that "if there is anything that is clear about the original understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it is that Lyman Trumbull, who managed that Amendment in the Senate,
assured his colleagues up and down that nothing in that proposed Amendment would call
into question those laws in Illinois as well as Virginia that barred interracial marriage").
14. Much of this evidence has until recently been difficult to find, but new digital
databases have greatly facilitated the collection of relevant evidence. In this article, I have
relied heavily on Lexis, Google Books, and the newspaper database of the "Chronicling
America" project. Further, this study is greatly indebted to the work of historians Peter
Wallenstein and the late Peggy Pascoe.
15. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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understood by the citizens that proposed, ratified, and initially
interpreted it, precluded the making or enforcing of state racial-
endogamy laws, insofar as such laws prohibited or invalidated
marriages between citizens of the United States.
As a preliminary matter, I should explain my preference for the
term "racial endogamy" instead of "anti-miscegenation." Racial
endogamy is a more precise term, for anti-miscegenation laws
reached not only marriage, but also nonmarital sex; yet the
Fourteenth Amendment, as originally understood, may have
protected the former, but almost certainly not the latter.16 Besides its
imprecision, "miscegenation" was a pejorative neologism (invented
by critics in 1863)17 that begged a central question at issue during
Reconstruction. The term miscegenation presupposed that the
different races represented different genera, whose intermarriage
constituted a mixing (miscere) of these genera. Yet according to
leading Republican framers, the Fourteenth Amendment recognized
no genera except humanity and citizenship, that is, the human race
and the American people'-so marriage between American citizens,
of whatever race, could not be properly called a mixing of different
genera.
16. See, e.g., Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U.S. 225, 227-28 (1876) (unanimously affirming that
both adultery and fornication are "[b]eyond all doubt, offences [that] involve moral
turpitude"); Ford v. State, 53 Ala. 150, 151 (1875) (distinguishing interracial marriage,
arguably protected by the Constitution, from interracial adultery, which is not, for
"[m]arriage may be a natural and civil right, pertaining to all persons," but "adultery is
offensive to all laws human and divine, and human laws must impose punishments
adequate to the enormity of the offence and its insult to public decency"). For more
recent (but pre-sexual-revolution) authority, see, e.g., Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 26
(1948) (Traynor, J.) (plurality opinion) (distinguishing racial-endogamy laws from the
interracial adultery law upheld in Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883), on the grounds
that "adultery and nonmarital intercourse are not, like marriage, a basic right, but are
offenses subject to various degrees of punishment"); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
193 (1964) (unanimously affirming that a statute dealing with "with illicit extramarital and
premarital promiscuity" could be properly characterized as an effort "to prevent breaches
of the basic concepts of sexual decency" but striking down the law because it discriminated
on the basis of the race).
17. PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY: MISCEGENATION LAW AND THE
MAKING OF RACE IN AMERICA 28 (2009).
18. John Bingham, a leading sponsor of the Amendment, published his speech
introducing an initial draft of the Amendment under this title: "One Country, One
Constitution, and One People: Speech of Hon. John A. Bingham, of Ohio, in the House of
Representatives, February 28, 1866: in Support of the Proposed Amendment to Enforce
the Bill of Rights." AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 387
(2005) (emphasis added).
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I. The Pre-Amendment Understanding of State Racial-
Endogamy Laws and the Abridgement of the Privileges of
Citizenship
Let us begin with the primordial originalist evidence: the actual
text of the Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or
Immunities Clause reads as follows: "No state shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States."9  In this part, we will consider whether this
provision, as its express terms were understood before the Fourteenth
Amendment, would have precluded state racial-endogamy laws. The
inquiry can be divided into three parts: (1) whether such restrictions
were deemed laws "made or enforced" by the states; (2) if so,
whether such laws "abridged" some right; and (3) if so, whether the
right so abridged represented a privilege or immunity of citizens of
the United States.
A. No State shall make or enforce any law...
The first issue can be easily answered. Racial-endogamy laws
were universally understood to be laws made by the states. Before
the Civil War, these laws were entirely statutory. And for the most
part only state legislatures made these laws.2' These state restrictions
were in derogation of the common law2' and thus neither declaratory
nor clarificatory of the common law, which was generally not deemed
to be law made by the states.22
To be sure, after the drafting of the Amendment (but not
before), some authorities would invoke another allegedly anterior
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
20. Other than local laws for the District of Columbia and some federal territories,
there were no federal laws. PASCOE, supra note 17, at 21. After the Civil War, federal
immigration law indirectly enforced a certain racial endogamy. See generally Rose Cuison
Villazor, The Other Loving: Uncovering the Federal Government's Racial Regulation of
Marriage, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1361 (2011).
21. See, e.g., JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC
RELATIONS 29 (2d ed., 1874) (noting that "race, color, and social rank do not appear to
constitute an impediment to marriage at the common law, nor is any such impediment
now recognized in England. But by local statutes in some of the United States, inter-
marriage has long been discouraged between persons of the negro, Indian, and white
races.") (emphasis added); Robertson v. State, 42 Ala. 509, 512 (1868) (Byrd, J.,
concurring) (citing Alabama's racial-endogamy statute to show that the legislature had
restricted the full common-law liberty to marry).
22. See, e.g., Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842) (holding that the general
commercial law and other laws of a "general nature," as opposed to merely local statutes
or local customs, were not laws of the several states).
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law-"natural law"-to justify this legislation.3 But this postbellum,
racialist account of natural law reflected the new racial science and
not traditional, natural-law and common-law jurisprudence.
4
According to this tradition, natural law embodied rules of widespread
recognition and universal validity.25 But the theory of natural law that
supported enforced racial endogamy had neither of these features.
6
As to general recognition, no authority, before or after the war, made
the manifestly false assertion that interracial marriages were generally
recognized as unlawful in the world in general, in the Christian world,
or even the Anglo-American world.27 Contrary to the naked assertion
23. See, e.g., State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 404 (1871) (referring to the "natural law
which forbids their intermarriage"); State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9, 11 (1872) (asserting that
neither incest nor polygamy is "more revolting, more to be avoided, or more unnatural"
than interracial marriage).
24. See, e.g., Keith E. Sealing, Blood Will Tell: Scientific Racism and the Legal
Prohibitions Against Miscegenation, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 559, 569 (2000) (contending
that postbellum judicial decisions endorsing racial endogamy were "[m]otivated wholly or
in part by scientific racism").
25. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 39-40 (1765) (Univ. Chi. 1979) (teaching that God "laid down certain
immutable laws of human nature, whereby that freewill is in some degree regulated and
restrained, and gave him also the faculty of reason to discover the purport of those laws,"
thus indicating that natural law involves general validity and recognition) (emphasis
added).
26. Consider, for instance, the oft-cited 1867 dictum of Pennsylvania's Supreme
Court: "[Tihe fact of a distribution of men by race and color is as visible in the
providential arrangement of the earth as that of heat and cold. The natural separation of
the races is therefore an undeniable fact, and all social organizations which lead to their
amalgamation are repugnant to the law of nature. From social amalgamation it is but a
step to illicit intercourse, and but another to inter marriage." West Chester & P. R. Co. v.
Miles, 55 Pa. 209, 213 (1867) (cited and discussed in Steven A. Bank, Comment, Anti-
Miscegenation Laws and the Dilemma of Symmetry: The Understanding of Equality in the
Civil Rights Act of 1875, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 303 (1995)). This "law of
nature" involved neither of the hallmarks of traditional natural law: general recognition
and validity. The recognition was not general, but dependent on the alleged scientific fact
of geographic separation-a fact not generally known to human reason. In fact, the court
suggested that in the absence of enforced segregation, the sexes of both races would be
naturally inclined to marry one another. Further, the validity was obviously not general-
for the court surely knew that in Pennsylvania itself and many other states, the law had
long recognized the full validity of interracial marriage.
27. See Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass. 157,161 (1819) (Parker, C.J.) (holding that an
interracial marriage celebrated in Rhode Island would be valid in Massachusetts, by
distinguishing interracial marriage, which Massachusetts "prohibited merely on account of
political expediency" from incestuous marriages, "which would tend to outrage the
principles and feelings of all civilized nations"); State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242, 245-47 (1877)
(citing Medway and rejecting the argument of counsel that a "marriage between persons
of different races is an unnatural and as revolting as an incestuous one," by noting that
while "all Christian countries agree that marriages in the direct line and between the
nearest collaterals, are incestuous, and that polygamy is unlawful," interracial marriages
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by the Kentucky and Georgia supreme courts, no legal authority
claimed that "miscegenation was an offense with ancient roots."28
Moreover, as to general validity, no one asserted that in the absence
of some local statute, such marriages were invalid by force of natural
law" or common law.3" Indeed, as peculiarly modern and local
statutes in derogation of the common law, courts tended to construe
these laws narrowly, by limiting the statute's territorial effect3 or in
other ways.2 As one jurist explained in 1883 (the same year the
Supreme Court decided Pace v. Alabama), "[m]arriage is a natural
right into which the question of color does not enter except as an
individual preference expressed by the parties to the marriage. It is
so recognized by the laws of all nations except our own., 33
do not offend "the common sentiment of the civilized and Christian world" even though
many southerners find them "revolting"); State v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 15 W. Va. 362,
385-86 (1879) (discussing certain "sections in [the state code] punishing offenses or acts
which can not be regarded as mala in se, or as contrary to religion or abstract morality;
[such] as the intermarriage of a white person with a negro").
28. Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 497 (Ky. 1992) (cited in ELLEN ANN
ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSETS & INTO THE COURTS: LEGAL OPPORTUNITY
STRUCTURE AND GAY RIGHTS LITIGATION 103 (2006)); Christensen v. State, 468 S.E.2d
188, 196 (Ga. 1996).
29. See e.g., JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE, AND EVIDENCE IN MATRIMONIAL SUITS 24, 54, 174 (1852) (defining
marriage as "a civil status, existing in one man and one woman legally united for life for
those civil and social purposes which are based in the distinction of sex" originating in "the
law of nature" and affirming that "when two persons agree to have that commerce for the
procreation and bringing up of children, and for such lasting cohabitation-that, in a state
of nature, would be a marriage," but noting that in some, but not all, the American states,
there are positive laws restricting such natural marriage between persons of different
races).
30. SCHOULER, supra note 21, at 20 (noting that such laws were in derogation of the
common law); 2 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, app. G, at 58
(1803) (noting that in Virginia, interracial marriage remained valid, though statutorily
illicit); Baity v. Cranfill, 91 N.C. 293, 295 (1884) (contrasting the common law's
nullification of certain immoral marriages with North Carolina's merely statutory
nullification of interracial marriages).
31. See, e.g., Ross, 76 N.C. at 245-47; Succession of Caballero v. Executor, 24 La.
Ann. 573, 575 (1872) (referring to Louisiana's racial-endogamy law as an "edict... of local
and limited effect [that] existed for a purpose local and special in this country").
32. Boyer v. Tassin, 9 La. Ann. 491, 492-93 (1854) (estopping a remarried widow
from denying the validity of her previous, interracial marriage on both statutory grounds,
for she had failed to follow the prescribed method of impeaching the marriage during her
husband's lifetime, and on quasi-equitable grounds, for her claim "present[ed] the
revolting spectacle of a mother attempting to deprive her children of their status or
position in society") (emphasis in original).
33. Gordon A. Stewart, Our Marriage and Divorce Laws, 23 THE POPULAR SCIENCE
MONTHLY 224, 234 (1883).
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B. ... which shall abridge ...
The second issue can likewise be easily answered. State racial-
endogamy laws emphatically "abridged" a right-they contracted a
prior right of individuals. Seemingly all authorities concurred that in
the absence of such positive law, the race of the parties was no
impediment to a lawful marriage.4 Because marriage arose from
natural right as recognized at common law, the "legalization" of
interracial marriages required merely the absence of the statutory
prohibition; so, for instance, Iowa's legislature permitted such
marriage simply by omitting the restriction from the state's 1851
code. Even in antebellum South Carolina, some prominent
authorities concluded that the lack of an express and specific
statutory prohibition36 implied the validity of interracial marriages."
34. See, e.g., Pearson v. Pearson, 51 Cal. 120, 124-25 (1875) (holding that a marriage
between a black slave and white slave-owner in the Territory of Utah ipso facto
emancipated the slave, and that because there was at the time of the marriage, "no law or
regulation at the time prevailing in the Territory of Utah interdicting intermarriage
between white and black persons," the marriage was valid there and remained valid even
after the couple moved to California where such marriage was locally unlawful).
35. ROBERT R. DYKSTRA, BRIGHT RADICAL STAR: BLACK FREEDOM AND WHITE
SUPREMACY ON THE HAWKEYE FRONTIER 109 (1993) (noting that through the 1851
codification, the legislature "silently revoked" most of Iowa's existing "black laws,"
including those concerning intermarriage). Compare LAWS OF THE TERRITORY OF IOWA
1838-1839, 1834-1840, at ch. 25, § 13 (declaring interracial marriages illegal and void) with
IOWA CODE OF 1851, ch. 85, §§ 1463-1479 (omitting any such prohibition).
36. South Carolina did not have a statute specifically addressing interracial marriage
until 1865; of course, public opinion had been very hostile to such marriage long before
then. JOHN WERTHEIMER, LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE SOUTH: A HISTORY OF NORTH
CAROLINA COURT CASES 31 (2009).
37. Bowers v. Newman, 27 S.C.L. (2 McMul.) 472, 486 (1838) (noting the extensive
argument of counsel as to the validity of an interracial marriage but refusing to decide the
issue); id. at 491-92 (Harper, C., dissenting) (contending that "marriage was merely a civil
contract, and that therefore, it was good and legal between a white person and a free
negro"); id. at 492 (O'Neall, J., dissenting) (noting his agreement with Chancellor Harper);
JOHN BELTON O'NEALL, THE NEGRO LAW OF SOUTH CAROLINA 13 (1848) (citing
Bowers and arguing that free blacks' "marriages with one another, and even with white
people, are legal"). See also Editorial, Judge O'Neall's Digest of the Negro Law of South
Carolina, THE ADVOCATE, Dec. 1848, reprinted in O'NEALL, supra, at 59, 60 (defending
O'Neall's claim on the authority of Blackstone's definition that marriage, i.e., the status of
"husband and wife," required merely that the man and woman (1) be able to contract, (2)
be willing to contract, and (3) have actually so contracted). But see Coloured Marriages, 1
CAROLINA L.J. 92, 101-104 (1830) (arguing that South Carolina law impliedly nullified
such marriages, for bona-fide marriage required that the parties enjoy a certain equality of
status, which free blacks, by force of statutory law, did not enjoy with whites); Editorial,
Judge O'Neall and the Judiciary Committee, THE TELEGRAPH, Dec. 25, 1848, reprinted in
O'NEALL, supra, at 57-58 (including a legislative committee report that cited the
Coloured Marriages article, supra, to dispute O'Neall's claim). All of these authorities,
however, concurred that the source of any restriction on interracial marriage was not
Wintor 9(11 1
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As the Illinois Supreme Court explained at the end of the century,
"the contract of marriage is a contract jure gentium, and consent and
the assumption of the marriage status are all that is required by
natural or public law," so "[i]n the absence of local restrictions or
regulations" a man and woman, regardless of race, were "capable of
contracting marriage as of common right."3
Racial-endogamy laws abridged this natural and common right in
various ways. Some laws criminalized the making of the marriage
agreement by punishing the parties and/or the official solemnizing
their agreement." Some laws, by declaring such marriages not only
illicit, but also invalid, criminalized the performance of the marriage
agreement, for the ensuing cohabitation and/or sexual intercourse
could be punished by force of general anti-fornication law 4° or special
statutes providing enhanced liability for interracial nonmarital sex."
There were significant civil consequences as well. The illegality of
such marriages could defeat a claim of a breach of a promise to
marry." And invalidity affected the custodial and property rights of
the putative husband and wife, and their resulting children."
C. ... the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States
Although it seems clear that state racial-endogamy statutes
abridged the marital right recognized at common law, what is far from
clear is whether that abridged right could be identified as a privilege
common law or natural law, but rather statutory law, whether an express, specific
prohibition, or a prohibition to be implied from statutes imposing civil inferiority on free
blacks.
38. Laurence v. Laurence, 45 N.E. 1071, 1072 (Ill. 1896) (citing both Hutchins v.
Kinemel, 31 Mich. 126 (1875), and BISHOP, supra note 29).
39. See, e.g., An Act to Prevent the Amalgamation of the White and Colored Races,
Acts, 58 Laws of Ohio 6 (Jan. 31, 1861); Fergus v. Nash, 48 Ohio L. Bull. 442, 442
(Franklin County, Ohio Probate Ct. 1901) (holding that "there seems to be little doubt
about the validity of the marriage [between a black man and white woman]" under Ohio's
1861 statute, for "although they might have been punished criminally for marrying, yet,
having married, the marriage was valid").
40. See, e.g., State v. Hooper, 27 N.C. 201 (1844).
41. See, e.g., State v. Brady, 28 Tenn. 74 (1848).
42. See Ferguson v. Bradshaw, Unpublished case, discussed in Editorial,
Miscegenatory: The African versus the Anglo Saxon, A Negro Sues and Recovers $10,000,
MEMPHIS DAILY APPEAL, Mar. 13, 1869 (Warren County, Ohio 1869) (discussed infra
text accompanying notes 275-80).
43. See e.g., Bailey v. Fiske, 34 Me. 77 (1852) (finding the son of an interracial
putative marriage to be illegitimate and thus unable to inherit from his natural father);
Boyer, 9 La. Ann. 491 (indicating that the invalidity of a white widow's husband would
impair the limited custodial rights of her relatives and those of her deceased husband).
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or immunity of citizens of the United States. The inquiry is nearly
impossible without some working definition of the terms "privileges
[and] immunities of citizens of the United States"-and there is no
scholarly consensus.' For purposes of this study, I propose, simply as
a working hypothesis,45 the following two-part definition. First, these
rights were privileges of citizenship, not universal human rights; these
rights were enjoyed by citizens as a matter of right but by aliens only
as a matter of indulgence, if at all. Second, these rights were, more
specifically, privileges of United States citizenship in at least two ways:
(1) each state in the Union had recognized these rights from the time
of American independence (1776); and, (2) by force of Article IV
and/or perhaps other law, during that same time, a bona-fide citizen
of any state had some right to enjoy these privileges in all the other
states of the Union, even if the citizen was a mere sojourner therein.
In other words, the states had been united in recognizing, for the
benefit of their own citizens, these privileges of citizenship and united
in extending these rights to citizens of each of the United States.
Accordingly, these privileges of citizenship did not include political
rights or other rights that the several states properly reserved to their
own resident citizens-especially where such discrimination was
essential to the integrity of the states as discrete republics.
6  This
definition is evidently based upon (1) the actual text of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause, (2)
Corfield v. Coryell,47 the antebellum authority most frequently cited
44. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3030 (2010) (Alito, J.) (plurality
opinion) (asserting the absence of any "consensus" as to the "full scope" of the Clause);
id. at 3089 & n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the original meaning of the Clause
is "not as clear" as petitioner's alleged and citing conflicting scholarly conclusions).
45. It would take a volume, perhaps, to defend this definition in the face of the
competing definitions that have been offered by judges and scholars. Still, this article will
support as well as rely on, this hypothesis in this limited respect: this definition (1) is
supported by the evidence of initial widespread constitutional objection to racial-
endogamy laws, and (2) helps explain the judicial evisceration of this objection in the
aftermath of the rival interpretation set forth in the Slaughter-House. See infra Part III &
Concl.
46. See, e.g., Murray v. M'Carty, 16 Va. 393, 398 (1811) (distinguishing the rights of
United States citizenship, such as holding land, from "those rights, which, from the very
nature of society and of government, belong exclusively to citizens of that state [such as]
the rights of election and of representation; for they cannot be imparted to any but
citizens, without a subversion of the principles of the social compact.").
47. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,320) (holding that
the "privileges and immunities" secured by Article IV include those rights "which are, in
their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments;
and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which
compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign").
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by the drafters of the Clause to explain its meaning, 4 and (3) the non-
guaranty of political rights as implied in section 2 of that
Amendment.49
1. Endogamy and the privileges of citizenship
At first glance, it may seem that interracial marriage was not at
all a privilege of citizenship. Marriage was generally deemed a
natural, universal, human right. As Attorney General Caleb Cushing
affirmed a decade before the Fourteenth Amendment, "[American]
Indians were human beings entitled to the rights of humanity...
including the rights of marriage and descent."" According to most
authorities, marriage was anterior to citizenship, for marriage was
logically and historically prior to civil society itself. To cite but one of
many authorities, James Wilson explained, "to the institution of
marriage the true origin of society must be traced."'" Accordingly, as
a general principle, neither citizenship nor the lack thereof affected
the anterior rights and duties of marriage; for example, the marriage
of two aliens married abroad was as valid as the marriage of two
citizens married domestically.2 Perhaps for this reason, before the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court held that the Privileges
48. David R. Upham, Note, Corfield v. Coryell and the Privileges and Immunities of
American Citizenship, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1483, 1484 (2005) (discussing the case's influence
on the drafters of the Amendment).
49. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
50. United States v. Ritchie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 525 (1855); see also Overseers of the
Poor of the Town of Newbury v. Overseers of the Poor of the Town of Brunswick, 2 Vt.
151, 159 (1829) (holding that "[t]o marry is one of the natural rights of human nature");
Stikes v. Swanson, 44 Ala. 633, 636 (1870) (finding that "[m]arriage is undoubtedly a
natural right, and slavery did not deprive the man in this condition of all his natural rights"
and that '[s]o far as was consistent with his status, these were allowed"); Campbell v.
Campbell, 37 Wis. 206, 214 (1875) ("Marriage was before human law, and exists by higher
and holier authority-the Divine Order, which we call the law of nature.").
51. James Wilson, Lectures on Law, in 2 WORKS 476 (1804); see also JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 100 (1834) ("Marriage is treated by all
civilized nations as a peculiar and favored contract. It is in its origin a contract of natural
law. It may exist between two individuals of different sexes, although no third person
existed in the world, as happened in the case of the common ancestors of mankind. It is
the parent, and not the child of society; principium urbis et quasi seminarium
reipublicae.").
52. See, e.g., STORY, supra note 51, at 277 (noting that "[m]arriage... is admitted to
be a valid contract everywhere, when it is so by the law of the place, where it is
celebrated"); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 599 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting)
("It is a principle of international law, settled beyond controversy in England and
America, that a marriage, valid by the law of the place where it was contracted, and not in
fraud of the law of any other place, is valid everywhere").
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and Immunities Clause of Article IV did not encompass certain
marital property rights because they did not "belong to citizenship."
3
Nonetheless, despite this general rule, citizenship (or the lack
thereof) was relevant to the scope of an individual's marital rights in
at least one respect: "citizenship" provided a limited immunity against
endogamy laws. This understanding derived, in part, from the
following facts: (1) that American legislators and jurists tended to be
familiar with both the Latin language and Greco-Roman history," (2)
that the terms "privilege," "immunity," and "citizen," were all words
of obvious Latinate origin, and consequently (3) that in defining these
terms, American legislators and jurists frequently made reference to
the privileges of Greek and Roman citizenship."
As American jurists knew well, under Greco-Roman law and
practice, the right of intermarriage was a cardinal privilege of
citizenship. In Roman law, this right, the ius connubii, involved the
freedom to intermarry with Roman citizens or more precisely, the
immunity from the endogamy law that prohibited aliens (peregrini)
53. Conner v. Elliott, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 591, 593 (1856) (holding that "no privileges
are secured by [the Clause], except those which belong to citizenship, and so [nlights,
attached by the law to [marital] contracts, by reason of the place where such contracts are
made or executed, wholly irrespective of the citizenship of the parties to those contracts,
cannot be deemed 'privileges of a citizen"'). But see Amy v. Smith, 11 Ky. 326, 342 (1822)
(Mills, J., dissenting) (contending that what makes "a citizen" is the enjoyment of certain
rights, including the "the right of acquiring and possessing property, of marriage and the
social relations").
54. See generally CARL J. RICHARD, THE GOLDEN AGE OF THE CLASSICS IN
AMERICA: GREECE, ROME, AND THE ANTEBELLUM UNITED STATES 5, 17 (2009) (noting
that nearly all the new universities founded before the Civil War required applicants to be
proficient in the classical languages and that in 1860, over one-fourth of the space in world
history textbooks was devoted to Greek and Roman history).
55. See, e.g., Attorney General Bates, Citizenship, 10 Op. Att'y. Gen. 382, 391-93
(1862) (noting, but criticizing, "the common habit of many of our best and most learned
men (the wise aptitude of which I have not been able to perceive) of testing the political
status and governmental relation of our people by standards drawn from the laws and
history of ancient Greece and Rome" but acknowledging the possible "analogy between
Roman and American citizenship"); Roberts v. Commonwealth (C.C. Ky. 5th Circuit
(Jefferson County) 1848), in 74 NILES' WEEKLY REG. 248, 249 (1848) (explaining that
"[t]he term citizen is derived from the Latin word "civis" or "civitas," in their origin
signifying a citizen or the State itself. Civis was one who was invested with the privileges
of the city, or State, as contradistinguished from those to whom these privileges were
denied. During the best and the purest days of the Roman Republic, to be a citizen in the
full sense of the term, was to have been invested with what were termed the "privatum
,us," and the "publicum jus,"); Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 478-80 (opinion of Daniel, J.)
(citing Roman law to argue that emancipation does not confer citizenship); Speech of
Hon. Owen Lovejoy in the House of Representatives, Apr. 5, 1860, available at
http://www.wvculture.org/history/jbexhibit/lovejoyspeech.html (arguing that the rights of
American citizenship were no less extensive than those of Roman citizenship).
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and other noncitizens, even if natives and free subjects of the
Republic or Empire, from such intermarriage.6 As a 19th century
textbook explained, the rights of Roman citizens included certain iura
privata, including this right of intermarriage, and the right to acquire,
transfer, and hold property of all kinds, as well as certain Jura publica,
such as the right to vote and hold office, and make certain judicial
appeals.7  Without the ius connubii, children resulting from such
putative marriages were denied the status and privileges of
citizenship.8 Similar endogamy rules prevailed in many of the ancient
Greek city-states; accordingly, Aristotle had famously called
intermarriage a peculiar characteristic of citizenship.9
Relying partly on Greco-Roman law, 19th century Americans
frequently identified the right of intermarriage as a privilege of
citizenship. One author explained, "[i]n all political bodies the right
of marriage (ius connubii) becomes in some form or other a
constituent element of citizenship."6  In a popular encyclopedia,
another author noted that in ancient Greece, certain states generously
granted "individuals and sometimes whole classes of aliens.., civil
rights, such as the privilege of intermarriage, of holding real property,
and of exemption from special taxation.61 In a similar vein, James
Wilson spoke of "the right of citizenship.., in the highest degree
too-I mean not only the right of commerce, the right of marriage,
the right of inheritance; but even the right of suffrage, and the right to
the offices and the honours of the republic"62; that is, the full private
and public rights of citizenship.
In this regard, of particular importance to our inquiry is
Chancellor James Kent's brief discussion of American citizenship and
56. "Aliens," in 1 THE AMERICAN CYCLOPEDIA 312, 312 (1873).
57. WILLIAM RAMSAY, AN ELEMENTARY MANUAL OF ROMAN ANTIQUITIES 39,
122 (1859).
58. Id. at 122; see also 1 STEWART RAPAUE & ROBERT LINN LAWRENCE, A
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN AND ENGLISH LAW 286 (1888).
59. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, bk. Il1, ch. 9, at 99 (Carnes Lord, trans. 1984)
(stating that intermarriage between the citizens (politeis) of two cities (poleis) would not
be sufficient to unify them into a single city (polis), even though intermarriage is one of
those aspects that is peculiar to the polis).
60. "Marriage" in DR. WILLIAM SMITH'S DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE 1793, 1796
(1872).
61. "Aliens," in 1 THE AMERICAN CYCLOPEDIA 312. Cf Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551-
52 (identifying the right to acquire property, real and personal, as well as an exemption
from special taxation, among the constitutional "privileges and immunities of citizens").
62. James Wilson, Lectures on Law, in 2 WORKS 446 (Bird Wilson ed., 1804)
(emphasis added).
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endogamy in his Commentaries. Kent was perhaps the most
prominent early authority to interpret Article IV's Privileges and
Immunities Clause to prohibit only interstate discrimination.63 In
elaborating this interpretation, Kent briefly compared the American
Union with the ancient Greece confederations. Unlike the American
states, he explained, the confederated Greek states "indulged such a
narrow and excessive jealousy of each other, that intermarriage was
forbidden, and none were allowed to possess lands within the
territory of another state."'  Kent thus indicated that among the
"privileges and immunities" to which the citizens of each American
state were entitled, throughout the Union, was the privilege of
intermarriage with citizens of other states. Therefore, for Kent, the
constitutional prohibition on interstate discrimination precluded any
state endogamy law, even if it had a formal equality, (like racial-
endogamy legislation), by prohibiting all citizens equally from
entering such "mixed" marriages.
At the same time, however, by the 19th century, the common
association of citizenship with the right of intermarriage had largely
become merely verbal and anachronistic, for the ancient impediments
to alien-citizen intermarriage had long been disfavored. Therefore, it
may seem, citizenship no longer gave any in-munitas at all, since non-
citizens had long been free of any munitas (burden or restriction) on
intermarriage with citizens. As Francis Bacon had noted two
centuries earlier, while among the Romans, citizenship involved "four
kinds, or rather degrees" of privileges, namely, "Ius Connubii, Ius
Civitatis, Ius Suffragii, and Ius Petitionis or Honorum," the first "is a
thing in these times out of use: for marriage is open between all
63. Upham, supra note 48, at 1504-05 & n.99.
64. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 62 (1827).
65. Kent's claim here, of course, would support the conclusion that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause would preclude restrictions on interracial marriage, provided the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited interracial discrimination much as Article IV was said
to prohibit interstate discrimination. For an early statement of this view, see Slaughter-
House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 100-01 (Field, J., dissenting) ("What the clause in question
did for the protection of the citizens of one State against hostile and discriminating
legislation of other States, the fourteenth amendment does for the protection of every
citizen of the United States against hostile and discriminating legislation against him in
favor of others, whether they reside in the same or in different States."). See also John
Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1467
(1992) (endorsing Field's view).
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diversities of nations."66  Accordingly, in the late 19th century,
Alexander Cockburn, the Lord Chief Justice of England,
categorically asserted that "[a]liens are everywhere allowed to
intermarry with the subject,,67  and a federal judge
contemporaneously declared that "[t]he relation of husband and wife
is not inconsistent with one being a citizen and the other being an
alien."'  Indeed, insofar as intermarriage conferred automatic
citizenship (as it frequently did under 19th century American law),69
intermarriage was not so much a privilege of citizenship as citizenship
was a privilege of intermarriage."
Nonetheless, Bacon and Cockburn overstated the matter. In
some respects, in the modern era, the legal connection between
intermarriage and citizenship endured, for some endogamy rules still
impeded aliens' intermarriage with citizens. Under the Anglo-
American common law, such intermarriage remained disfavored: the
wife was denied the full property rights of marriage, and the alienage
of either husband or wife would prevent the widow from enjoying the
estate of dower.71 Moreover, various English statutes governing
Ireland had imposed ethnic or religious endogamy rules. Before the
Reformation, the Statutes of Kilkenny (1367) prohibited the
conquered Irish from intermarriage with English subjects.7 ' After the
Glorious Revolution, Parliament adopted similar statutes to prohibit
66. Francis Bacon, A Brief Discourse Touching the Happy Union of the Kingdoms of
England and Scotland, in 3 THE LETTERS AND THE LIFE OF FRANCIS BACON,
INCLUDING ALL His OCCASIONAL WORKS 90, 97 (James Spedding ed., 1868).
67. ALEXANDER COCKBURN, NATIONALITY: OR, THE LAW RELATING TO
SUBJECTS AND ALIENS 139 (1869).
68. Comitis v. Parkerson, 56 F. 556, 562 (C.C.E.D. La. 1893).
69. See ALEXANDER PORTER MORSE, A TREATISE ON CITIZENSHIP, BY BIRTH
AND BY NATURALIZATION 137-44 (1881) (explaining in what way intermarriage between
a citizen-husband and his alien wife can act to naturalize the wife).
70. In the 20th century legal authority tended to treat this immunity of citizenship as
a universal human right: "Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race,
nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family." Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, art. 16, G.A. Res. 217A U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (emphasis added).
71. 1 CHARLES H. SCRIBNER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOWER 143-45 (1867)
(cited in 5 CHESTER G. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF THE FAMILY A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE FAMILY LAW OF THE FORTY-EIGHT
AMERICAN STATES, ALASKA, THE DISTRICr OF COLUMBIA, AND HAWAII 293 n.1
(1938)).
72. THOMAS BARTLETT, IRELAND: A HISTORY 58 (2010).
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Irish Roman Catholics from intermarriage with Irish Protestants;
73
according to critics, this compulsory religious endogamy amounted to
ethno-national endogamy, as Catholics thus became aliens vis-A-vis
the dominant Protestants and were barred from incorporation into
one, multi-religious people in Ireland.74 Furthermore, in the United
States, federal law frustrated the intermarriage of alien men with
American women by suspending the wife's citizenship (and any
attendant privileges) during the course of such marriage, at least if the
woman did not retain American residence.75 Granted, however, the
United States lifted these restrictions as to intermarriage with citizens
of certain countries by treaty.6 Finally, some American Indian
nations erected more imposing barriers. The Cherokee Nation
declared "null and void" any marriage between a Cherokee woman
and a white man unless the white man had first taken an oath of
allegiance to the Nation-that is, unless the white man had first been
quasi-naturalized as a Cherokee.7 The Choctaw Nation passed a
similar law. Attorney General Cushing noted that Congress had
comparable authority to prohibit such intermarriage.
79
73. See, e.g., An Act to Prevent Protestants Intermarrying with Papists, 9 Will III c.3
(1697).
74. Henry Grattan, Speech on the Roman Catholic Bill (Feb. 22, 1793), in 3 THE
SPEECHES OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE HENRY GRATTAN: IN THE IRISH, AND IN THE
IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT 43, 52 (Henry Grattan, Jr., ed., 1822). Parenthetically, we might
note that Grattan's speech indicates the interesting parallels between the status of Roman
Catholics in Ireland during the eighteenth century and the status of free blacks in the
United States in much of antebellum and postbellum Jim Crow America. Id.
75. Case of Madame Berthemy, 12 Op. Atty. Gen. 7, 7-9 (1866) (holding that a
woman born in France to a United States citizen had lost her natal citizenship upon her
marriage in France to a Frenchman). Cf. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915)
(interpreting and upholding federal statutory law suspending a woman's citizenship while
married to an alien, even if the woman remained a resident of the United States).
76. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Nicar., June 21, 1867, art.
IX, 18 Stat. (2) 566, 569; General Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Consular Privileges,
U.S.-El Sal., Dec. 6, 1870, art. 29, 18 Stat. (3) 725, 739.
77. CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, ch. XII, art. XV, at
221-24 (1875).
78. CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE CHOCTAW NATION 225-26 (1894)
(prohibiting an American citizen from intermarriage with a member of the tribe unless he
had first sworn to "honor, defend, and submit to the constitution and laws of the Choctaw
Nation"); see In re Choctaw Nation Cases (D. Ind. Terr. 1899), reprinted in 2 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, app. 12, at 91, 100-104 (1899)
(discussing this 1875 statute with apparent approval).
79. Jurisdiction of the Courts of the Choctaw Nation, 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 174, 185
(1855) ("Congress might, if it pleased, prohibit any white man from intermarrying with
Indians and from acquiring, in this or any way, the tribal rights of person and property; but
it has not done so.").
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In each of these cases, then, outsiders were still subject to a
burden on their intermarriage with insiders-a munitas; but
membership in the community relieved individuals from this
burden-an immunitas. Stated otherwise, at the time of the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment, citizenship still involved a certain
immunitas from the endogamy restriction frequently imposed against
noncitizens.
In this limited respect, then, "marriage" remained a privilege of
citizenship. Parenthetically, this privilege did not necessarily entail a
right to marry any person of one's choice. This immunity involved a
right to intermarry with other citizens, not aliens. As Alabama's
Supreme Court would explain in 1872, the privileges of citizenship
included the right "of marriage with any citizen capable of entering
into that relation." ° Further, arguably this immunity did not entail
even a right to marry any citizen of one's choice. The immunity from
enforced endogamy did not encompass a freedom from laws against
incest or other rules encouraging exogamy. Such laws arguably did
not abridge any right of citizenship but served, instead, to establish
and maintain a common citizenship among a people. To mandate-
or at least encourage-that marriage occur only across familial lines,
or even regional or racial lines, may be critical to the creation of a
common citizenship-insofar as intermarriage blends separate
communities "into one by ties of blood and children.,81 Such was no
doubt the inspiration, for instance, of Patrick Henry's proposal that
80. Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195, 198 (1872).
81. PLUTARCH, ON THE FORTUNE OR THE VIRTUE OF ALEXANDER (Frank Cole
Babbitt trans.), available at http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/
Moralia/FortunaAlexandri*/1.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2013); W. B. Allen, Guinier's
Poetry of Race; or, When Accepting the Reality of Difference Means Conceding Different
Realities, 5 THE GOOD SOCIETY 32, 36 (1995) ("If we follow teachings as old as Aristotle,
namely that political community requires a supporting dynamic of social unity, the
institutional designs that would engage our attentions on Guinier's reading of the facts
would be measures to foster mutual interdependence and concourse rather than political
measures to highlight group independence . . . Intermarriage would be a far more
effective counsel than political isolation and, if broadly embraced by opinion leaders,
would doubtless change the society more swiftly."). Cf. Orestes Augustus Brownson,
Emancipation and Colonization (April 1862), in 17 WORKS 253, 266 (Henry F. Brownson
ed., 1885) ("There can be no society between persons who have a mutually instinctive
aversion to intermarriage; for marriage is the basis of the family, and the family is the basis
of general society; when therefore the different races or varieties are separated by too
broad an interval for the family union, it is clear that they cannot form one and the same
society.").
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Virginia adopt a discriminatory fiscal policy to encourage
intermarriage between American Indians and white Virginians.82
2. Racial endogamy and the privileges of citizenship
In antebellum America, by far the most discussed and
controversial form of enforced endogamy was racial. The
implications of racial-endogamy laws became a frequent topic in
broader debates over black citizenship. Most commentators agreed
that the existence of such restrictions demonstrated that blacks did
not share a common citizenship with white Americans. As one
Founding-era writer explained, Americans were simply unwilling to
allow freed blacks "all the privileges of citizenship," including the
"free intercourse and intermarriage with the white inhabitants," by
which a united people would be cemented by "common interest."83
Another author, writing in 1803, explained that freed blacks would
always remain a "distinct people," for they were "[d]enied the
privilege of intermarriage" with the "white people."' Throughout the
19th century, commentators made similar observations.85
Most observers added that racial endogamy reflected not only
blacks' exclusion from, but also their subordination to, the white
citizenry. James Kent, in the second edition of his treatise, cited these
laws as evidence that persons of the "African race were essentially a
degraded class.86 A Connecticut court relied on this comment to
82. WILLIAM WIRT, SKETCHES OF THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF PATRICK HENRY
173-74 (1850).
83. Ferdinando Fairfax, Plans for Liberating the Negroes Within the United States, 8
THE AMERICAN MUSEUM OR UNIVERSAL MAGAZINE 285, 285 (1790). Fairfax was a
prot6g6 of George Washington. Benjamin Schwarz, What Jefferson Helps to Explain, THE
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1997, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/
97mar/jeffer/jeffer.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2013).
84. On the Moral and Political Effects of Negro Slavery, 2 THE BALANCE AND
COLUMBIAN REPOSITORY 185, 186 (1803).
85. See e.g., Joseph Holdich, Judgment for the Oppressed, 5 METHODIST MAG. & Q.
REV. 412, 421 (1834) (discussing the difficulties of withholding from free blacks the
"privilege of intermarriage" when they were "otherwise admitted to equality" with white
citizens); 2 JOHN HOWARD HINTON, THE HISTORY AND TOPOGRAPHY OF THE UNITED
STATES 311 note b (1832).
86. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 258, note a (2d ed., 1832);
accord Coloured Marriages, supra note 37, at 97-98 (citing racial-endogamy laws to show
that "it is manifest that the people of colour are, in every part of the United States,
considered, not merely by the populace, but by the law, as a permanently degraded
people; not participating as by right, of the civil privileges belonging to every white man,
but enjoying what civil privileges they possess, as a gift and grant, as a matter of favour
conceded by the law, and revocable by law").
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hold that blacks were not citizens under the federal Constitution.87
Another writer compared the racial endogamy of the early American
republic with the caste endogamy of the early Roman Republic; just
as the plebs had been forbidden to intermarry with the patricians, so
too were blacks prevented from intermarriage with whites: "The
[Roman] commons struggled violently for even the privilege of
intermarriage with the nobles, which was forbidden by law .... The
amalgamation was regarded pretty much in the same light, as that in
this country, between the black and the white." Likewise, H. Ford
Douglas, a fugitive-slave turned abolitionist orator, cited the historian
Thomas Babington Macauley to compare American racial relations
with post-conquest Norman-Saxon relations: "it was considered as
disgraceful for a Norman to marry a Saxon as it is now for a white
person to marry a negro.'8
Because racial-endogamy laws were indicative of blacks' status as
alien, and even inferior, to the white citizenry, these laws were
frequently invoked in debates as to the rights of free blacks under
Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause.9" In the 1820-1821
controversy over Missouri's admission-with a state constitution that
would prohibit free blacks from even entering the state-supporters
of Missouri's admission repeatedly argued that that free blacks could
not be "citizens" of any state that prohibited their intermarriage with
whites.91 Delaware's Representative Louis McLane remarked: "If
they were citizens, these [marital] disabilities could not be imposed
upon them, but for some personal defect. The real truth is, sir, that
they are nowhere considered as members of the civil society, but as
87. Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339, 346 (1834) (reporting the jury instructions given
by the trial judge).
88. Henry M. Brackenridge, Editor's Preface to 3 HUGH H. BRACKENRIDGE,
MODERN CHIVALRY: OR, SEQUEL TO THE ADVENTURES OF CAPTAIN FARRAGO, at iv
(1857).
89. H. Ford Douglas, I Do Not Believe in the Antislavery of Abraham Lincoln, in
LIFT EVERY VOICE: AFRICAN AMERICAN ORATORY, 1787-1900, at 340, 348 (Philip
Sheldon Foner & Robert James Branham eds., 1998).
90. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
91. See, e.g., THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES, 16th Cong, 2d sess., at 546-47 (remarks of Representative Barbour of Virginia)
(arguing that even in Massachusetts free blacks did not enjoy "full enjoyment of civil
rights" such as the right of intermarriage); id. at 66-67 (Sen. Smith) (arguing that
"marriage to whomever the citizen shall think proper [is] a right of the highest
importance" that is "secured to every [bona-fide] citizen").
[Vol. 42:2
inhabitants of the country, holding their rights at the will of the local
authority.,
92
In subsequent decades, the connection between racial endogamy
and non-citizenship reappeared frequently in both legislative halls93
and courts.94 One Kentucky court, for instance, rejected a black
defendant's claim of citizenship under Article IV by comparing "the
condition of the descendants of... emancipated negroes" to that "of
the freed slaves and their descendants in the earlier days of the
Roman Republic. There neither the freed slave nor his descendants,
wheresoever born, could be citizens or intermarry with citizens ....
The same principle applies in America."95  Therefore, "[t]he
emancipated negro and his descendants to the last generation are
alike deprived of citizenship. " 96
In his opinion for the Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford,97 Chief
Justice Taney famously went further: colonial racial-endogamy laws
demonstrated the Founders' view of blacks as not only noncitizens,
but even subhuman.9 But among antebellum authorities, Taney's
opinion was singular in drawing such an extreme conclusion.
Through the Civil War, some jurists opposed to black citizenship
offered a complementary argument. They claimed that free blacks
could not be citizens under Article IV, for the "privileges and
immunities" to which they would be entitled included an immunity
92. Id. at 616.
93. Debate in the Senate on the Admission of Iowa and Florida, 68 NILES' WEEKLY
REGISTER, Mar. 29, 1845, 55, 62 (reporting argument that even in Massachusetts and
Maine, free blacks were not citizens because barred from juries and intermarriage with
whites, to which Massachusetts Senator Rufus Choate replied that Massachusetts had just
abolished the prohibition on such intermarriage); JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION,
ASSEMBLED AT SPRINGFIELD, JUNE 7,1847 [FOR] REVISING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
STATE OF ILLINOIS 475 (1847) (reporting one delegate's motion to strike any suggestion
from the state bill of rights that free blacks enjoyed "privileges and immunities" as citizens
of Illinois or the United States, for Illinois law clearly denied such persons citizenship by
subjecting them to "severe penalties" for intermarriage with whites); CONG. GLOBE, 35th
Cong., 2d sess. 986 (1859) (remarks of Representative Sandridge during Oregon debates).
94. Hobbs v. Fogg, 6 Watts 553, 558-59 (Pa. 1837) (attempting to prove "that no
coloured race was party to our social compact" by citing colonial racial-endogamy laws
still in force in 1776).
95. Roberts v. Commonwealth (C.C. Ky. 5th Circuit (Jefferson County) (1848)),
supra note 55, at 248, 249.
96. Id.
97. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
98. Scott, 60 U.S. at 407-409 (citing racial-endogamy statutes as evidence that the
Founders considered blacks not only unfit for citizenship, but even "so far below [the
whites] in the scale of created beings" for "intermarriages between white persons and
negroes or mulattoes were regarded as unnatural and immoral, and punished as crimes").
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against local racial-endogamy laws-and this result was so contrary to
well-accepted practice as to be absurd: "If negroes are citizens,
[racial-endogamy] laws amount to the worst forms of political
proscription and degradation," one pro-slavery jurist explained.'
These laws "have received the popular sanction from time
immemorial. Marriage, in the eye of the law, is a civil contract, and
any abridgement of the rights of citizens, in this matter, that does not
operate equally upon all classes, is an unconstitutional
proscription. '""'0 In a similar vein, during the Civil War, Senator
Garrett Davis of Kentucky (later a member of the 39th Congress)
denounced President Abraham Lincoln's policy of enlisting the
freedmen into the military with the promise of citizenship: As
"citizens of the United States[,]" the freedmen would be
constitutionally "entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of
citizens of the other States" without regard to race, including freedom
from state laws prohibiting blacks' migration, residence, and
intermarriage with whites."
Unlike Kent, these jurists assumed that the "privileges and
immunities of citizens" guaranteed in Article IV included an
immunity against not only interstate discrimination but also
interracial discrimination.°2 Accordingly, while Kent thought the
Clause protected the right to marry across state lines, these jurists
concluded the Clause would protect marriages across racial lines as
well-but only in the counter-factual world where free blacks were
bona-fide citizens.
Stephen Douglas adopted this position during his 1858 debates
with Lincoln. In accusing Lincoln of defining the term "citizens" to
99. GEORGE S. SAWYER, SOUTHERN INSTITUTES: OR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE
ORIGIN AND EARLY PREVALENCE OF SLAVERY AND THE SLAVE TRADE 299 (1859).
100. Id.; see also MARVIN T. WHEAT, THE PROGRESS AND INTELLIGENCE OF
AMERICANS 555 (1862) (contending that if free blacks were citizens of a state, "the slave
States have ever acted unconstitutionally with most of the free States" for a genuine
citizen could not be forbidden from intermarriage with another citizen: "What law is there
in any State forbidding [sic] a male citizen from marrying a female citizen? ... Most of the
States forbid the marriage of whites to [colored persons], for sound reasons.") (emphasis
in original).
101. Garret Davis, The Exchange of Prisoners, White Men Imprisoned for the Sake of
the Negro!, Speech in the United States Senate, December 15, 1863, HOLMES COUNTY
FARMER. (Millersburg, Ohio), Jan. 28, 1864, at 1, available at http://chroniclingamerica.
loc.gov/lccn/sn84028822/1864-01-28/ed-1/seq-1/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2013).
102. This opinion was increasingly popular among both pro-slavery and Republican
leaders on the eve of the Civil War. See David R. Upham, Meanings of the "Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens" on the Eve of the Civil War 32-56 (Mar. 11, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2107460).
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encompass free blacks, Douglas argued that the "privileges and
immunities" to which black citizens would be thus (outrageously)
entitled included, inter alia, the right to "marry whom they please."'0 3
Stated otherwise, the male citizen, as such, had the "privilege of
marrying any woman he may select.""' For his part, Lincoln denied
any intention to recognize or confer either black citizenship or the
right of intermarriage (but he did not elaborate whether the former
would entail the latter)."" Lincoln was wise to take this position-
support of racial-endogamy laws was nearly unanimous in antebellum
Illinois.""
Two years later, William English, a Democratic congressman
from neighboring Indiana, leveled Douglas' accusation against the
whole Republican Party. He decried the tendency of Republican-
leaning states to grant the right of intermarriage and other privileges
of citizenship to free blacks. English complained that in most of the
states that had voted for Republican presidential candidate John C.
Fr6mont, there was no law prohibiting such intermarriage.7 In this
103. Stephen A. Douglas, Speech at Bloomington (July 16, 1858), in POLITICAL
DEBATES BETWEEN HON. ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND HON. STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS 24,36
(1860).
104. Douglas, Speech at Springfield (July 17, 1858), in POLITICAL DEBATES
BETWEEN HON. ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND HON. STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS 40,52 (1860).
105. Abraham Lincoln, Speech in Fourth Joint Debate at Charleston, in POLITICAL
DEBATES BETWEEN HON. ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND HON. STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS 136,
136 (1860) (asserting "that I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of bringing about in any
way the social and political equality of the white and black races-that I am not nor ever
have been in favor of making voters or jurors of negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold
office, nor to intermarry with white people" and that "I will to the very last stand by the
law of this State, which forbids the marrying of white people with negroes"); Abraham
Lincoln, Rejoinder in Fourth Joint Debate at Charleston, id. at 156 (saying "very frankly
that I am not in favor of negro citizenship").
106. In 1845, by a roll-call vote, the Illinois House of Representatives unanimously
resolved against any repeal of the laws prohibiting blacks' intermarriage with whites.
SUNBURY AMERICAN AND SHAMOKIN JOURNAL (Pa.), Feb. 1, 1845, at 2, col. 6, available
at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85054702/184 5-02-O1/ed-1/seq-
2 / (last visited on
Feb. 10. 2013).
107. William H. English, The Political Crisis-The Danger and the Remedy, Speech in
the House of Representatives 7 (May 2, 1860) available at http://archive.org/details/
politicalcrisist00engl. English was correct, for as of 1861, nine of the eleven Fremont
states had no such laws. The following eleven states had either repealed, or had never
adopted, such restrictions: New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts (repeal 1843),
Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania (repeal 1780),
Minnesota, Iowa (repeal 1851), and Wisconsin. PETER WALLENSTEIN, TELL THE COURT
I LOVE MY WIFE: RACE, MARRIAGE, AND LAW-AN AMERICAN HISTORY 253-54
(2002). Nine of these eleven states (all but New Jersey and Pennsylvania) were among the
eleven states that had supported Fremont in 1856. DONALD RICHARD DESKINS ET AL.,
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1789-2008: COUNTY, STATE, AND NATIONAL MAPPING OF
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regard, he singled out Massachusetts as the exemplar of Republican
extremism: "In Massachusetts, which is a type of them all, and may
justly be considered the model Republican State of the Union,
negroes are.., clothed with the privileges and immunities of the
white man.""' These privileges included not only the rights of travel,
of residence, and of "competing with the white man in his labor," but
also the right to vote, hold office, practice law, sit on juries, testify
(even against whites), send their children to interracial schools, and
"what is worse, intermarry with white persons, thus legalizing a
disgusting, revolting, and ruinous system of practical
amalgamation.'19
Contrary to English's accusation, many Republican moderates
remained opposed to black citizenship, and some openly agreed that
multiracial citizenship would nullify racial-endogamy laws. Orestes
Brownson"' favored post-emancipation colonization instead of the
freedmen's admission to "perfect equality with the white race, in one
and the same civil and political community."11' "By what right," he
asked, could you "forbid [intermarriage] by law.., if you deny all
distinction in the case, and assert the black and white races are
equal?""'
In response to these arguments, some supporters of black
citizenship disputed the alleged inconsistency between multi-racial
citizenship and enforced racial-endogamy. During the Missouri
admission debates, for example, Representative William Eustis of
Massachusetts argued that his state's law, operating equally on white
as well as black, did not abridge black citizenship: "The same law, sir,
interdicts the marriage of a white man with a black woman. The law,
then, applies equally to both, and cannot justify the inference which
ELECTION DATA 159-160 (2010). The two Fremont states that had these laws were Ohio
and Michigan. See infra text accompanying notes 238-48 (discussing the non-enforcement
of these laws in the five years following ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment).
108. English, supra note 107, at 7.
109. Id. Accord Remarks of Hon. Thomas J. Orr, in [Ohio] Senate, January 31st, 1861,
on House Bill No. 46, to Prevent the Amalgamation of the African with the White Race, in
Ohio, DAILY OHIO STATESMAN, Feb. 6, 1861, at 2 (asserting that many Republicans
"wish to make the black man equal to the white man, and to give him all the rights and
privileges of citizens. Do this and the inevitable result would be the intermarriage of the
two races" (emphasis added)).
110. PATRICK W. CAREY, ORESTES A. BROWNSON: AMERICAN RELIGIOUS
WEATHERVANE 268 (2004).
111. CAREY, supra note 110, at 264.
112. Id. at 265.
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has been drawn from it....3 In effect, "if the black man, ceased to be a
citizen because he had lost this civil right. . . the white man also must
be determined not to be a citizen."1"4 In subsequent decades, this
argument was reiterated by others, most notably a justice of the
Supreme Court of Maine"' (which did not fully repeal its statute until
1883)..6 and the anti-slavery jurist John Codman Hurd."7
Opponents of black citizenship ridiculed these arguments. In the
Missouri debates, one congressman treated the argument as unworthy
of serious response:
But one of the gentlemen.., has been pleased to say,
that if the black man cannot marry with the white, so
the white man cannot marry with the black, and
gravely inferred, that therefore, the whites could not
be citizens! This observation might, indeed, rather
afford matter for amusement, than of sober reply; but,
as I deem the latter unnecessary, I will not consume
time in indulging the former."8
113. 16 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
16th Cong., 2d sess. at 637 (1820).
114. Id.; see also id. at 96 (remarks of Sen. Otis) ("Why was a black person
disqualified as a citizen by being inhibited from marrying a white person more than a
white person was so under a reverse of the rule?").
115. "The statutes, on this subject, apply equally to the white and the black, and are
designed to prevent all who are desirous to enter into such marriage, from so doing. It
shows that the legislature deems such unions inexpedient, and as a matter of public policy
to be prohibited; but it is difficult to perceive why it is more onerous upon one race than
the other, (for the assumption is that both desire it, and hence the prohibition,) or why it
should deprive either of citizenship." Opinion of the Justices of Supreme Judicial Court,
44 Me. 505, 564 (1857) (Appleton, J.).
116. WALLENSTEIN, supra note 107, at 254.
117. 2 JOHN CODMAN HURD, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE 286 n.2 (1862)
("If restriction, in respect to marriage, is incompatible with citizenship, why is not the
prohibition on the white to marry a negro to be considered? To assume that what is
disability on the one party is privilege on the other, is very like begging the question.").
Arguing on behalf of a black woman's claim to Article IV citizenship, Connecticut's
William Ellsworth made a somewhat different, more radical argument: "Marriage and
citizenship have no relation to each other-they are founded upon and regulated by
different considerations. The legislature have a right, (if they please to exercise it,) to
regulate marriage according to age, or property, or profession, or color. Citizenship is
founded in the tie of natural allegiance." REPORT OF THE ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL IN
THE CASE OF PRUDENCE CRANDALL, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, VS. STATE OF
CONNECTICUT 11 (1834). Obviously, then, this interpretation would permit laws
restricting intermarriage between citizens of different classes, for instance.
118. 16 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
16th Cong., 2d sess., at 620 (1820) (remarks of Rep. McLane of Delaware).
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Indeed, no antebellum opponent of black citizenship (to my
knowledge) conceded or even took seriously that racial-endogamy
laws were compatible with equal multiracial citizenship.
In fact, many supporters of black citizenship agreed: they
acknowledged that full citizenship includes the privilege of
intermarriage. Still, they insisted that the impairment of this one
privilege did not destroy all the other privileges of citizenship.
According to a writer in The Abolitionist, although "cruel" statutes
had stripped free blacks of such privileges as the right to "intermarry
with the whites... these laws [did] not deprive them of citizenship [in
other respects]."'119 The common law, he explained, had conferred the
full status and privileges of citizenship to every free person born
within the state; accordingly, "the free native colored man cannot be
deprived of any one of the smallest privileges of citizenship, except by
express enactment.""12  Even if statutory law had abridged one
privilege of citizenship, the citizen did not lose the others: a citizen
"cannot be robbed of the whole of these privileges without some
direct provision of law.. 2
On the eve of the Civil War, this argument was elaborated by
John McCune Smith, "the foremost black intellectual in nineteenth-
century America.122  Like many of his contemporaries,123 McCune
Smith understood that citizenship was "of [L]atin derivation" and
"gathers its purport and exact meaning from the Roman Republic; it
originated and grew under the Romans.'1 2' Enumerating the rights of
Roman citizenship, he contended, "the possession of all or any of
them constituted citizenship on the part of the individual holding
them."'" In other words, the enjoyment of one privilege of
119. Miss Crandall's Second Trial, 1 THE ABOLITIONIST, Nov. 1833, at 162, 168.
120. Id.
121. Id. (emphasis added). Cf., JAMES DUNCAN, A TREATISE ON SLAVERY: IN
WHICH IS SHOWN FORTH THE EVIL OF SLAVE HOLDING BOTH FROM THE LIGHT OF
NATURE AND DIVINE REVELATION 104 (Amer. Anti-Slavery Society 1840) (1824) ("It is
granted [intermarriage] might be the consequence [of emancipation], yet it would be much
better that it should be so than worse. As matters now stand, a mixture of color is rapidly
increasing by means of illicit embraces, much more than could be expected by lawful
marriages, if they were all free and independent... ").
122. JOHN STAUFFER, Introduction to THE WORKS OF JAMES MCCUNE SMITH:
BLACK INTELLECTUAL AND ABOLITIONIST xiii, xiii (2006).
123. See supra note 55.
124. John McCune Smith, Citizenship, 1 THE ANGLO-AFRICAN MAGAZINE, 1859, at
144, 146, available at http://lincoln.lib.niu.edu/file.php?file=angloafricanl.html.
125. Id. at 147 (emphasis in original).
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citizenship was a sufficient, not a necessary condition for the
enjoyment of the status of citizenship. One of these privileges was
the ius connubii: "'the right of marriage.'' 126  He explained that
Roman law's initial prohibition of "intermarriages between the
Patricians and the Plebeians" was akin to the prior Massachusetts
restriction on "intermarriage between whites and blacks.'
'27  He
added that just as "this restriction did not, in Rome, destroy the
citizenship of the Plebeian, neither could it in 
Massachusetts.' 21
This Roman history, and the recent repeal in Massachusetts,
provided hope that free blacks would eventually enjoy, throughout
the Union, full citizenship, including the ius connubii: "[t]his
restriction was soon abolished in Rome, as has been done in
Massachusetts [in 1843].''129 The suggestion here was that the
enjoyment of any one privilege of citizenship conferred the status,
and that status, in turn, should eventually lead to the conferral of all
the other privileges, including the ius connubii; such had been true of
the Roman Republic, was true of the state of Massachusetts, and
would one day perhaps be true throughout the whole American
Republic.
The conclusion that racial-endogamy laws unjustly impaired (but
did not destroy) the rights of citizenship seemed likewise to prevail
among legislators who successfully resisted these measures. As David
Fowler pointed out, many held that "public enforcement of caste
violated social values even more primary than caste, namely,
Christian brotherhood and the political equality of 
free individuals.'
130
This conclusion influenced the rejection of these laws by the




129. Id. (footnotes omitted).
130. DAVID H. FOWLER, NORTHERN ATTITUDES TOWARDS INTERRACIAL
MARRIAGE: LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC OPINION IN THE MIDDLE ATLANTIC AND THE
STATES OF THE OLD NORTHWEST, 1780-1930, at 215 (1987).
131. JOHN WOOD SWEET, BODIES POLITIC: NEGOTIATING RACE IN THE AMERICAN
NORTH, 1730-1830, at 180 (2003) (noting that one state senator explained that his
colleagues had rejected a racial-endogamy law because "[i]n so important a connection,
they thought the free subjects of this State ought to be left to their free choice"). David
Fowler finds that "none of the Middle Atlantic states seems to have considered seriously
the enactment of an intermarriage law" from 1790 to 1830, and infers that "to many or
most whites, caste solidarity mattered less than other social values." FOWLER, supra note
130, at 106.
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latter state, a legislative committee raised a "deep[]" and "important"
objection: that "[h]owever revolting the intermarriage of blacks and
whites may be to every person of correct and delicate feelings," it
would be wrong "to restrain the natural liberty of the citizen in any
particular, except when the safety of society, the right of property[,]
or public morals demand it. '
As Fowler explained, this committee report exemplified both the
antebellum "case against intermarriage laws [and] the anti-Negro bias
which permeated the ranks of those who resisted the laws."'34 Critical
to the committee's position, at once racist but opposed to racist
legislation, was the distinction between racist feelings and public
morals; this distinction reflected the widespread opinion that
interracial marriage was distasteful but morally licit (unlike, e.g.,
incest and polygamy).'35
The successful efforts to repeal the ban in Massachusetts
occasioned the most important elaboration of the relation between
citizenship and intermarriage. In response to a petition presented by
thousands of men and women,'36 a joint committee of the legislature
recommended repeal in 1840.' The committee began its analysis by
invoking "the theory of our government and the letter of our
Constitution," by which "the races whose intermixture is prohibited
by the statutes.., are entitled to stand as citizens upon a footing of
entire civil equality, and exempted from all partial disabilities."'38 The
committee argued that free blacks were already bona-fide citizens,
and that racial-endogamy laws wrongly imposed such "partial
disabilities." The committee vigorously refuted the claim "that there
132. WALLENSTEIN, supra note 107, at 40. Pennsylvania had repealed its law in 1785;
one proponent of repeal argued that such legal prohibitions would not be "consistent with
natural right." FOWLER, supra note 130, at 87.
133. Committee on the Judiciary System, Report on "An Act to Prevent the
Intermarriage of White and Black Persons and Mulattoes," reprinted in 1 JOURNAL OF
SENATE (Pa.), 1841, at 282, 283 (emphasis added). The committee, however, suggested
the "citizen" whose liberty was to be secured was the white citizen's, for later in the report,
the committee commented that blacks were "denied the privilege of citizenship." Id. at
284.
134. FOWLER, supra note 130, at 174.
135. See supra note 27.
136. Louis Ruchames, Race, Marriage, and Abolition in Massachusetts, 40 J. NEGRO
His. 250, 267 (1955), available at https://pantherfile.uwm.edu/margo/public/FedlStatistical
System/2715951.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
137. H.R. Rep. No. 46, 1st Sess., at 2 (Mass. Mar. 6, 1840), available at http://archive.
org/stream/inhouseofreprese00mass/inhouseofrepreseOmass-djvu.txt.
138. Id.
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is no inequality, because no restriction is interposed against the
marriage of blacks with whites, which is not also interposed against
the marriage of whites with blacks":
[T]his form of oppression is not a new one. It has
repeatedly been resorted to in past ages, by tyrants or
bigots, who sought to separate the objects of their
persecution from all those social influences which
mitigate party strife and sectarian hatred. But that it
was oppression, and was so meant, was never denied in
any case till the present. In the histories of the
reformation, we find the prohibition, by the catholic
authorities, of marriages between persons professing
different religions, enumerated and classed by the
historian with those regulations which removed
protestants from all public institutions and from acting
as guardians to the young, deprived them of the rights
of citizens, ordered that they should not be received as
apprentices. It was reserved for the astuteness of this
day to discover, that what the common sense of
mankind had for ages stigmatized as an act of
persecution, was in fact no persecution or annoyance
at all.'39
The Massachusetts committee added that the imposition of these
"peculiar disabilities""1 ' contravened not only blacks' citizenship but
even their emancipation. The committee advocated the repeal of this
"relic" of slavery, for native freedmen were entitled all "the privileges
and immunities of freemen.,
141
William Lloyd Garrison likewise called the law "a disgraceful
badge of servitude."'142  In this latter respect, many pro-slavery
Americans agreed with the committee. Consider these comments of
Maryland's Senator Reverdy Johnson, a future member of the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction:
139. Id. at 3-4. The poet John Greenleaf Whitter, a signatory to one of the petitions,
similarly argued that the law was "the offspring and relic of the old slave laws of
Massachusetts." See Ruchames, supra note 136, at 259.
140. H.R. Rep. No. 46, 1st Sess., at 6 (Mass. Mar. 6, 1840).
141. Id. at 7-8 (emphasis added).
142. Ruchames, supra note 136, at 253.
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You [antislavery citizens] talk about a free man, and
yet this man who is free and equal, according to your
idea of the subject, is not permitted... to intermarry
with a white [or enjoy other civil rights]. What, then,
does constitute a freeman? Oh, yes, I suppose he
enjoys liberty. Liberty! Deprived of every privilege,
yet enjoys liberty! He is a freeman, and yet can
exercise no franchise that pertains to a freeman! [H]e
enjoys the shadow of the name of being a freeman, but
is stripped of all the franchises that constitute a
freeman.143
After a few narrow defeats, the repeal efforts in Massachusetts finally
succeeded in 1843.14
II. Racial-Endogamy Laws and the Adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment
Therefore, before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
according to the seemingly universal understanding of antebellum
authorities, racial-endogamy laws were (1) positive laws made by
some states, (2) which impaired a preexisting right recognized at
common law. Moreover, most, but not all, legal authorities concluded
that (3) the right so abridged represented a privilege of citizenship.
Opinions for and against such laws were largely (though not
precisely) coextensive with opinions against and for black citizenship,
respectively.
Therefore, it was not surprising that when the 39th Congress
proposed to amend the federal Constitution by (1) defining
citizenship without regard to race or previous condition of servitude,
and (2) prohibiting the states from making or enforcing any law that
should abridge the "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
143. Reverdy Johnson, Invasion of Harper's Ferry, Speech in the Senate of the United
States, December 12, 1859, NASHVILLE UNION AND AMERICAN, Dec. 23, 1859, at 2,
available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85038518/1859-12-23/ed-l/seq-2/ (last
visited Sept. 12, 2013). At the close of the Civil War, Charles Chauncey Burr insisted that
blacks should not be permitted to intermarry with whites or otherwise be admitted to
membership in the sovereign people. C. Chauncey Burr, White Supremacy and Negro
Subordination, 3 THE OLD GUARD 193, 196-98 (1865). Burr was a peculiar person: a
former abolitionist turned white supremacist, his magazine was temporarily suppressed
during the Civil War. DAVID W. BULLA & JUSTYNA SEMPRUCH, LINCOLN'S CENSOR:
MILO HASCALL AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN CIVIL WAR INDIANA 93 (2008).
144. Ruchames, supra note 136, at 269-73.
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States," that many thought this Amendment might abrogate state
racial-endogamy laws. As we shall see below, the Amendment was
generally understood, during its framing and adoption, to preclude
the making or enforcing of such laws.
A. Democratic Objections
In Congress, a leading opponent of the Amendment,
Representative Andrew Rogers of New Jersey, repeatedly argued
that the "privileges and immunities" to be secured would include the
right of intermarriage."' Although a member of the Joint Committee
on Reconstruction that had drafted the Amendment, he apparently
heard nothing in committee to assuage his objections. As reported in
one newspaper, Rogers contended that "[t]he right of marriage came
under the general meaning of privileges and immunities, and a black
man could, under the [the Joint Committee's initial version of the
Amendment], go into a State and claim the privilege of marrying a
white woman."'4 6  In discussing the final version, Rogers raised a
similar objection: "What are privileges and immunities? Why, sir, all
the rights we have under the laws... The right to vote is a privilege.
The right to marry is a privilege...",'
During ratification, opponents made similar allegations. One
Tennessee newspaper concluded that there was "no reasonable
question" that the legalization of interracial marriage was one of the
"intended effects" of the Amendment, for the "language is clearly
susceptible of this construction, and however revolting its
enforcement upon an unwilling people may be, it will unquestionably
be insisted upon, the moment it is ratified."'48 Many others made a
similar objection.'49 A joint committee of the North Carolina
145. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess. at House app. 134 (1866).
146. Specimen of Democratic Eloquence, BURLINGTON WEEKLY FREE PRESS (Vt.),
Mar. 9, 1866, at 1, available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn860721
43/1866 -03
09/ed-1/seq-l/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2003).
147. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess. 2538.
148. Editorial, Political Violence-the Constitutional Amendment, DAILY UNION AND
AMERICAN (Nashville), June 27, 1866, at 2, available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/
lccn/sn85038519/1866-06-27/ed-1/seq-2/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2013).
149. See, e.g., Editorial, Will the South Adopt the Constitutional Amendment?, THE
ANDERSON INTELLIGENCER (Anderson County, S.C.), Nov. 1, 1866, at 2, available at
http:/chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84026965/1866-11-Ol/ed-1/seq-
2/ (last visited Feb.
27, 2013); Great Ratification Meeting-Conservatives in Council-Speech of Judge John S.
Brien, DAILY UNION AND AMERICAN (Nashville), Oct. 28, 1866, at 1, available at
http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85038519/1866-10-28/ed-1/seq-l/ (reporting Judge
Brien's speech, including the claim that racial-endogamy laws would be "abrogated" by
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legislature was also worried, though less so. The committee
recommended against ratification, in part because the federal
government might declare these "privileges or immunities" to include
intermarriage.' Although conceding that such a declaration was not
"probable," the committee insisted this result was sufficiently
"possible" that the Amendment should be rejected.'
B. Republicans' Tacit (or Not so Tacit) Acknowledgement
In response to these objections, leading Republicans and
Democrats provided little to no reassurance. In the 39th Congress,
the silence was deafening. Indeed, my research has not identified any
instance where a supporter expressly assured, or an opponent
expressly conceded, that the privileges of citizenship to be guarantied
would not include an immunity from racial-endogamy laws. This
silence is, of course, in sharp contrast with the prominent,
authoritative assurances and concession made during the adoption of
the Civil Rights Act.'52 As the Supreme Court noted in Loving,
Virginia's attorneys cited substantial evidence related to
Reconstruction-era statutes, but none of the assurances concerned
the Fourteenth Amendment itself.
53
To be sure, there is abundant evidence of nearly universal
distaste for, and even disapprobation of, interracial marriage. Some
scholars have presented such statements as proof that Republicans
favored racial-endogamy laws. For instance, some have cited James
E. Bond's study of the ratification debates in the Midwest as evidence
the Amendment); "N[-]r Equality": a Democratic "Snivel," HIGHLAND WEEKLY NEWS
(Ohio), Oct. 3, 1867, at 2, available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85038158/
1867-10-03/ed-1/seq-2/ (reporting one "copperhead's" objection).
150. Joint Select Committee on Federal Relations, Report (December 6, 1866), in
JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA, 1866-
1867 sess., at 91, 96 (1867).
151. Id.; see also JAMES E. BOND, NO EASY WALK TO FREEDOM: RECONSTRUCTION
AND THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 59 (1997) (discussing this
report); see also id. at 192 (noting similar objections in an Arkansas newspaper).
152. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 505 (1866) (remarks of Senator
Lyman Trumbull); Andrew Johnson, II [Second Veto Message], March 27, 1866, in VETO
MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, WITH THE ACTION OF
CONGRESS THEREON, 297, 299 (Benjamin Perley Poore ed., 1886) (conceding that the Act
would not "repeal [I State laws on the subject of marriage between the two races").
153. Loving, 388 U.S. at 9 (noting that the statements "pertained to the passage of
specific statutes and not to the broader, organic purpose of a constitutional amendment").
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of Loving's inconsistency with originalism."' But Bond did not adopt
that conclusion, and the only relevant evidence he presented is one
proponent's vehement denial that white supporters of racial equality
wanted their daughters to intermarry with black men.155 This speaker
mocked the coarse, racist speech of Democrats156 and disavowed any
personal inclination to intermarry, but added that any legal
restrictions would be unnecessary and improper: "For my part, I
should burn with shame and mortified indignation, if I supposed that
any legislation, any Constitutional enactment was required to be
thrown around my daughters to shield their purity, and the integrity
and high sublimity of their personal virtue. '  This statement, then,
evinces opposition not only to interracial marriage, but also to laws
restricting it.'
In fact, opponents of racial-endogamy laws typically protested
their personal aversion to interracial marriage. To cite one example,
at the Arkansas constitutional convention of 1868, various delegates,
both black and white, successfully argued against the inclusion of any
racial-endogamy rule in the state's constitution; but they also joined a
unanimous resolution expressing their "opposition to all
amalgamation between the white and colored races, whether the
same is legitimate or illegitimate.'5 9 One delegate argued, perhaps
154. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 5, at 1920, n.99; DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA
SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 175 n.57 (2002).
155. James E. Bond, The Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in
Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, 18 AKRON L. REV. 435, 457 & n.152 (1985).
156. Id. ("'Are you in favor of your daughter marrying a big buck n[-r?"').
157. Id. Another comment, sometimes cited, is Pennsylvania Representative Glenni
Scofield's remark, in January 1866, that interracial marriage would not result from black
suffrage in the District of Columbia: "[No] person of common sense can bring himself to
believe that marriages between any persons, much less between white and colored people,
will take place because a colored man is allowed to drop a little piece of paper in a box."
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess. 180 (1866). One scholar has used this quote as evidence
that "Republicans refused to extend the Fourteenth Amendment prohibition on
discrimination ... to the question of marriage." Jane Dailey, Marriage, Mixed, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICAN AMERICAN HISTORY, 1619-1895: FROM THE COLONIAL
PERIOD TO THE AGE OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 330, 332 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2006).
Yet Scofield was plainly speaking about the likelihood of such marriages, not their
legality, for the Republican Congress had repealed the local racial-endogamy statute in
1862. For a discussion of this repeal, see infra text accompanying notes 180-89.
158. In his study of the debates in the South, Bond likewise provided no evidence of
any assurance that such laws would not be affected. See BOND, NO EASY WALK, supra
note 151.
159. DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION WHICH ASSEMBLED AT
LITTLE ROCK, JANUARY 7,1868, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT OF CONGRESS OF
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counter-intuitively, that if "legal intercourse" should be permitted,
but extra-marital interracial intercourse vigorously prohibited, there
would be a net decrease in interracial cohabitation, whether legal or
not 60 Avins, then, was, for the most part, correct in concluding that
neither white nor black Republicans "advocated miscegenation.'
61
But disapprobation did not imply approval of legal restriction.62
On the other hand, some proponents of the Amendment at least
implied that it would not adversely affect intermarriage statutes. Just
two and half weeks after voting for the Fourteenth Amendment,
Senator Waitman Willey, a Republican from West Virginia, explained
that black suffrage would create "no barrier to the interposition of
legislative prohibitions against such intermarriage," which restriction,
he said, might be justified "if the good of society should render it
necessary.'163  Furthermore, Senator Lyman Trumbull repeatedly
MARCH 2D, 1867, AND THE ACTS OF MARCH 23D AND JULY 19TH, 1867,
SUPPLEMENTARY THERETO, TO FORM A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF ARKANSAS
489, 500, 504, 507 (1868). For a good treatment of these debates, see Paul C. Palmer,
Miscegenation as an Issue in the Arkansas Constitutional Convention of 1868, 24 ARK.
HIST. Q. 99 (1965).
160. Id. at 503 (comments of James Hodges).
161. Avins, supra note 12, at 1253. One prominent exception was George Downing,
who spearheaded the repeal efforts in Rhode Island. Downing, George Thomas, in 6
AFRICAN-AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 847 (Henry Louis Gates ed., 1999)
(quoting Downing's claim that "[t]he world has no such beauties as are the product of the
Africo-American with other races in America"). Another prominent exception was the
Methodist preacher Gilbert Haven. GEORGE PRENTICE, THE LIFE OF GILBERT HAVEN:
BISHOP OF THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH 298-301 (1883) (quoting Haven's
sermon defending the "right and fitness" of intermarriage). Not surprisingly, in
antebellum America, the leading proponent of interracial marriage was Garrison.
FOWLER, supra note 130, at 150.
162. See, e.g., THE BLACK LAWS! SPEECHES OF HON. B. W. ARNETr OF GREENE
COUNTY, AND HON. J. A. BROWN, OF CUYAHOGA COUNTY, IN THE OHIO HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, MARCH 10, 1886 (transcribed 1994), available at lcweb2.loc.
gov/rbc/lcrbmrp/t0d/tOdO6.sgm-old (last visited Nov. 13, 2014) ("The question of marrying
white women is not in this bill, but is one of individual taste and preference, and no
reasonable person should, for one moment, think of connecting the two together. The
intent of the repeal of these laws is to break down that legal wall that is now built up
between citizens of the same rights and obligations ..... There are many reasons why I
prefer our own women. I think that colored men ought to marry their own women, and
white men ought to stay on their own side of the fence, and if any person desires to know
the character of society, let them look at our congregations and the various complexions.
It has been the pouring of black veins, until it is almost impossible to tell where the white
race begins or the black one ends. I have a pride for the women of my race; I am proud of
their beauty.").
163. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st sess. 3437 (1866). As Avins properly emphasized,
this statement is especially important given that Willey was a Republican who had recently
voted for the Amendment. Avins, supra note 12, at 1237.
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suggested that the first section of the Amendment served only to
constitutionalize the restrictions of the Civil Rights Act' 6 -which Act,
he had elsewhere said, did not secure the right of interracial
marriage.165 Although neither of these senators expressly made the
reassurance in connection with the Fourteenth Amendment, the
inference can plainly be drawn from their various statements.
A more emphatic implied reassurance is found in the votes of
some state legislators. In Oregon, just after Unionists barely secured
ratification, the legislature fell to Democratic control, and voted both
to rescind ratification and to extend the state's 1862 ban on interracial
marriage.166 While Democratic legislators insisted that no one who
had voted for the Amendment could also vote for this statute, most
167
Amendment supporters (now in the minority) did so anyway.
Still, it should be noted that Oregon was something of a political,
as well as geographic, outlier. Relative to the other antebellum free
states, Oregon had arguably the most racist citizenry. In 1859, the
state had adopted a constitution that controversially prohibited black
immigration' (a provision not formally repealed until 1926),169 and in
1860, the state gave nearly as many votes to the pro-slavery
Breckenridge as to Abraham Lincoln.7° In the 1866 election, the
people had elected a pro-Amendment majority in the legislature, but
that coalition was explicitly Unionist rather than Republican.'71
164. Senator Trumbull in Chicago, SPEECHES OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1866 IN THE
STATES OF OHIO, INDIANA AND KENTUCKY (1866) (stating that section 1 was "a
reiteration of the rights as set forth in the Civil Rights Bill"); Speech of Senator Trumbull,
Delivered at Evanston, Illinois, August 31, [1866], in id. at 49 (stating that Section 1 was
"an unnecessary provision, perhaps, since the passage of the Civil Rights Bill and the
abolition of slavery").
165. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st sess. 505 (1866).
166. PASCOE, supra note 17, at 77-80.
167. Cheryl A. Brooks, Comment, Race, Politics, and Denial: Why Oregon Forgot to
Ratify the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 OR. L. REV. 731, 743 (2004) (citing, inter alia, the
comment of Isaac Cox that he would vote for the statute "believing, as I do, that those
laws of Congress, and that the late amendments to the Constitution will, in the course of
time, be declared null and void" but that supporters could not vote for the law).
168. 2 HENRY WILSON, HISTORY OF THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SLAVE POWER IN
AMERICA 624-27 (1879).
169. Darrell Millner, Oregon, in BLACK AMERICA: A STATE-BY-STATE HISTORICAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA 679, 680-82 (Alton Hornsby, Jr., ed., 2011).
170. EUGENE M WAIT, OPENING OF THE CIVIL WAR 4 (1999). Breckenridge's
performance in Oregon (34.8% to Lincoln's 36.6%) nearly matched his results in pro-
slavery Kentucky (36.4%), and far exceeded his results in pro-slavery Missouri (18.9%).
Id.
171. Brooks, supra note 167, at 742.
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In more mainstream Ohio, however, some Republicans likewise
suggested the constitutionality of such laws under the pending
amendment. As in Oregon, after the legislature voted for ratification,
the Democrats obtained a majority, voted to rescind ratification, and
proposed to extend the state's intermarriage law. Like in Oregon,
some minority Republicans voted for the measure; still, about half of
the Republicans in the Ohio House opposed the law, and the bill
never reached a vote in the Ohio Senate.172
To be sure, the votes of these Republican legislators occurred
before the Amendment became effective (in July 1868). Nonetheless,
these actions provide significant evidence that some supporters of the
Amendment at least impliedly denied that racial-endogamy laws
would be nullified.
Nonetheless, by and large, supporters of the Amendment did not
respond to Democrats' intermarriage objection. According to Avins,
this Republican silence simply reflected Republican "scorn. '173 But
there are five good reasons to conclude that this silence represented
tacit concession.
First, the evidence surveyed above indicates that the express
terms of the Citizenship and Privileges or Immunities Clauses, as
widely understood before 1866, would have precluded any state law
that would abridge the right of intermarriage or other fundamental
privilege of citizenship.174 Given this background, the failure to clarify
otherwise confirmed, rather than denied, the threat posed to state
racial-endogamy statutes.
Second, many Republicans, both in Congress and the country at
large, had demonstrated hostility to racial-endogamy laws for
decades. As noted above, in the heavily anti-slavery (and future
Republican) states of Massachusetts and Iowa, the legislature had
repealed the state statutes in 1843 and 1851, respectively.175 In 1859,
the strongly Republican territorial legislature in Kansas territory had
taken the same step.76 In the same year, Republican legislators in
Wisconsin overwhelmingly rejected such a law.77 In 1860, the
172. FOWLER, supra note 130, at 231-32 & n.24.
173. Avins, supra note 12, at 1235.
174. See supra Part I.
175. Supra text accompanying notes 35, 136-44.
176. PHYL NEWBECK, VIRGINIA HASN'T ALWAYS BEEN FOR LOVERS:
INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE BANS AND THE CASE OF RICHARD AND MILDRED LOVING
42 (2004).
177. FOWLER, supra note 130, at 187-92 (showing that roughly half of House
Republicans and nearly all Senate Republicans voted against the bill).
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Republican majority in the Ohio House likewise rejected such a
proposal (though many changed sides and voted for a prohibition
during that "mad winter of compromise" of 1861)."T8 And in 1864,
Unionists in Louisiana had made unsuccessful repeal efforts.79
Perhaps the most important pre-1866 evidence of this
Republican hostility or recklessness was Congress' repeal of the
racial-endogamy law in the District of Columbia. In 1862,
congressional Republicans repealed the District's entire "black code"
(adopted from Maryland laws) that had included, inter alia, provisions
criminalizing and invalidating interracial marriage. The general
repeal required that "persons of color" be "subject or amenable" only
"to the same laws and ordinances to which free white persons are or
may be subject or amenable."''
Although this general repeal did not specifically mention
marriage, some proponents almost certainly knew that the measure
would sweep away the extant racial-endogamy laws.82 The sponsor of
178. Id. at 194-201; BEVERLY LOWRY, HARRIET TUBMAN: IMAGINING A LIFE 271
(2008) (quoting the abolitionist Franklin Sanford).
179. Official Minutes of the House of Representatives of the State of Louisiana, The
Daily True Delta (New Orleans), Jan. 4, 1865, at 1, available at http://news.google.com/
newspapers?nid=iQFVEgXGzMC&dat=18650104&printsec=frontpage&hl=en
(reporting Representative Marie's introduction of a repeal measure) (last visited Mar. 11,
2013). In 1865, the Illinois legislature repealed much of the state's black code but did not
repeal the intermarriage law. FOWLER, supra note 130, at 223.
180. THE BLACK CODE OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, IN FORCE SEPTEMBER 1ST,
1848, Chaps. IX, XIII (Worthington G. Snethen ed., 1848).
181. An Act Providing for the Education of Colored Children in the Cities of
Washington and Georgetown, District of Columbia, and for Other Purposes, § 4,12 STAT.
407 (May 21, 1862)
That all persons of color in the District of Columbia, or in the
corporate limits of the cities of Washington and Georgetown, shall be
subject and amenable to the same laws and ordinances to which free
white persons are or may be subject or amenable; that they shall be
tried for any offences against the laws in the same manner as free
white persons are or may be tried for the same offences; and that, upon
being legally convicted of any crime or offence against any law or
ordinance, such person of color shall be liable to the same penalty or
punishment, and no other, as would be imposed or inflicted upon free
white persons for the same crime or offence; and all acts, or parts of
acts, inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed
(emphasis added).
182. Contemporaries noted this effect. See MICHAEL THOMPSON, AN ANALYTICAL
DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: CONTAINING ALL THE LAWS OF
MARYLAND OF FORCE AND APPLICABLE IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, AND THE
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this general repeal was Senator Henry Wilson, who had championed
racial-endogamy repeal efforts in Massachusetts two decades
earlier.183  Furthermore, as Wilson later recalled, 4 during the
preceding congressional debates, Democrats had accused proponents
of desiring or advocating intermarriage with blacks, but Republicans
answered the charge with counter-accusations of the same,l8 5 or with
conspicuous silence.'86 But no supporter of the general repeal of the
black code sought any special exception for intermarriage laws.
Parenthetically, note that the statute containing this repeal is
most famous, as its title indicates, for establishing schools for "colored
children" in the District.1 87 This statute thus has provided evidence
that congressional Republicans were favorable toward educational
racial segregation. As Michael McConnell has remarked, this statute
is"[t]he single piece of evidence most often cited in support of the
proposition that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
ACTS OF CONGRESS IN RELATION TO THE DISTRICT, To MARCH 3,1863, at 296 & note a
(1863) (noting the effect that the comprehensive repeal had on racial-endogamy laws).
See also COMPILATION OF THE LAWS IN FORCE IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, APRIL
1, 1868, at 159-64 (1868) (including various pre-cession Maryland marital statutes but
conspicuously omitting the prohibition on intermarriage).
183. ELIAS NASON, THE LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF HENRY WILSON 48 (1881)
(showing that Wilson supported the Massachusetts repeal in 1843); JONATHAN B. MANN,
The Life of Henry Wilson: Republican Candidate for Vice-President, 1872, at 95 (1872)
(noting that Wilson introduced the amendment to repeal the black code). Wilson's
involvement in the repeal of both the Massachusetts racial-endogamy law and D.C.'s black
code was noted by the attorneys in Brown. See Brief of Appellants, Brown v. Board of
Ed., 344 U.S. 1 (1953) (Nos. 1, 2, and 4 and for Respondents in No. 1 on Reargument),
available at http://law.jrank.org/pages/11477/Brief-Appellants-in-Nos-1-2-4-Respondents-
in-No-10-on-Reargument-ARGUMENT.html.
184. HENRY WILSON, HISTORY OF THE ANTISLAVERY MEASURES OF THE THIRTY-
SEVENTH AND THIRTY-EIGHTH UNITED-STATES CONGRESSES, 1861-64, at 49-53 (1864).
185. Id. See, e.g., 37th Cong., 2d sess. 1357 (1862) (remarks of Rep. Harlan). Harlan
was from Iowa, which, like Massachusetts, had repealed its racial-endogamy law before
the War. Supra note 35.
186. John Bingham was challenged on the question of whether black citizenship
entailed the right of intermarriage and the right to vote. Bingham denied that citizenship
would automatically give blacks the suffrage, but said nothing about intermarriage. Id. at
1639. A decade later, during the debates leading to the Civil Rights Act of 1875,
congressional Republicans would likewise tacitly indicate the invalidity of racial-
endogamy laws. Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81
VA. L. REV. 947, 1018 (1995) ("But it is striking that not a single supporter of the 1875 Act
attempted to deny that under their interpretation, anti-miscegenation laws were
unconstitutional.").
187. An Act Providing for the Education of Colored Children in the Cities of
Washington and Georgetown, District of Columbia, and for Other Purposes, § 1, 12 STAT.
407 (May 21, 1862).
[Vol. 42:2
deem school segregation unconstitutional."'88 But as to marriage, this
statute provides opposite evidence-Republicans were reckless or
even hostile toward marital segregation.189
Third, contemporaneous with the adoption of the Amendment
(1866-1868), many Republicans continued their campaign against
racial-endogamy laws. As early as March 1864, Horace Greeley had
argued, in company with other abolitionists, that "under the
Constitution in its most liberal interpretation, and admitting our
cherished American doctrine of equal human rights, if a white man
pleases to marry a black woman, the mere fact that she is black gives
no one a right to interfere to prevent or set aside such marriage.' ' 9 In
1867, in response to an editorial of the ex-Republican New York
World, which had complained that "Republican legislation" had
made the question of interracial marriage "every day of fearful
practical importance," Greeley's Tribune denied there was any "case
in which the State would be justified in interfering to prevent such a
marriage any more than to command it." '191
More modestly, the New York Times conceded that if blacks
were admitted to full citizenship, they might enjoy intermarriage
rights, but argued that, in any case, "legalized intercourse was to be
188. McConnell, supra note 186, at 977.
189. Avins quotes a comment in December 1867 by Senator Samuel Pomeroy of
Kansas, indicating that he believed the prohibition, and the whole black code, remained
valid, and Sumner's terse response that it was "not expedient to raise any further
questions." Avins, supra note 12, at 1237-38 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess.
pt. 1 at 38-39 (1867)). Neither Pomeroy nor Avins seemed aware of the 1862 repeal of
this black code. Perhaps Sumner's change of the subject was an effort to spare Pomeroy
the embarrassment of a correction on the floor of the Senate.
190. SAMUEL S. Cox, EIGHT YEARS IN CONGRESS, FROM 1857-1865: MEMOIR AND
SPEECHES 353 (1865) (quoting this editorial). The Tribune disavowed the notion that
"such union would be wise, but we do distinctly assert that society has nothing to do with
the wisdom of matches." Id. Other advocates of black citizenship during the war made
similar claims. Id. (citing the abolitionist paper Principa for advocating interracial
marriage on these grounds "that God has made of one blood all nations of men, endowed
them with equal rights, and that they are entitled to all the civil and political prerogatives
and privileges of other citizens"); id. at 367 (quoting the conclusion that "equality before
the law, for the negro, secures to him freedom, privilege to secure property and public
position, and, above all, carries with it the ultimate fusion of the negro and white races").
See also HORACE GREELEY, HORACE GREELEY'S VIEWS ON VIRGINIA 2 (1872),
available at https://archive.org/stream/horacegreeleysvi00gree#page/
2 /mode/2 up (last
visited Jan. 1, 2014).
191. Editorial, Mixed Marriages, N.Y. DAILY TRIBUNE, Dec, 19, 1867, at 4, available
at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn8303021
4/1867 -12-10/ed-1/seq-4/.
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preferred to illegal [intercourse]. ' 92 And in August 1868, just after
the Fourteenth Amendment's full ratification, the Times again
acknowledged that Republicans sought to ensure that the "negro...
should share the privileges of other men," and conceded that such
privileges might involve 'a legal right to intermarry"'; nonetheless, the
"proper obstacle" to such intermarriage was "social opinion" and not
legal prohibition.1 93 In a similar vein, Harper's suggested that insofar
as freedmen enjoyed the "rights and prerogatives of citizenship,"
including "the equality of all men before the law," then "legal
barriers" to interracial marriage would be "broken down.'
194
While the Amendment was pending before the states,
Republicans continued their legislative efforts. Repeal measures
succeeded in Louisiana,'95 and the territories of New Mexico 96 and
Washington, passed one house of the Maine legislature,198 but failed
192. Editorial, Georgia, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1866, available at http://query.nytimes.
com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F20617F7345A1A7493C5AB178AD8 5F428684F9; but see
Editorial, Amalgamation in Nashville, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1866, at 4 (criticizing the New
York Tribune for making "[s]ocial equality" the newspaper's "mission.").
193. Editorial, The Grand Climax, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1868, at 4.
194. Editor's Book Table, 38 HARPER'S NEW MONTHLY MAG. 148, 148 (Dec. 1868)
(reviewing ANNA E. DICKINSON, WHAT ANSWER? (1868)). The author of this book
review, however, added that the "almost universal sentiment of aversion" would limit the
frequency of such marriages. Id.
195. Louisiana Acts of 1868, No. 210, at 278-79 (1868); the measure was not fully
passed until November 1868, after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, but had
been proposed and discussed in the previous summer while the Amendment was pending.
CHARLES VINCENT, BLACK LEGISLATORS IN LOUISIANA DURING RECONSTRUCTION
102-03 (2011).
196. WALLENSTEIN, supra note 107, at 253 (noting repeal in 1866). New Mexico's
repeal was part of a comprehensive repeal of the entire 1857 law adverse to free blacks.
HUBERT HOWE BANCROFr, ARIZONA AND NEW MEXICO, 1530-1888, at 683 (1888). In
December 1865, the territorial governor had urged this comprehensive repeal for this
reason: "The law relating to free negroes, is... in discord with the legislation of Congress,
and the proclamation of the President, abolishing slavery and restoring to civil rights the
freedmen of the African race, and should be made to conform to the status now occupied
by that race, under the laws of Congress." H.R.J. 15th Leg. 20 (N.M. Terr. 1866).
197. An Act to Amend an Act Entitled an Act to Regulate Marriages, Jan. 23, 1868, §
1, 1868 Wash. Terr. Stat. 619; Jason A. Gillmer, Crimes of Passion: The Regulation of
Interracial Sex in Washington, 1855-1950, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 393, 405-06, n. 75 (2011)
(noting this repeal and attributing it to Republicans' "desire to destroy the legal
distinctions based on race").
198. Editorial, Maine Legislature, NASHVILLE UNION AND DISPATCH, Feb. 7, 1867, at
2, available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85038521/1867-2.07/ed-l/seq-2/




overwhelmingly in Missouri.'99 At the same time, Reconstruction
conventions in at least six states-South Carolina, Mississippi,
Arkansas, Alabama, Georgia, and North Carolina-rejected
proposals to mandate racial endogamy in their state constitutions.o
Indeed, the actions and omissions of these conventions largely
confirmed the fears of legalized intermarriage. Indeed, in three
states-South Carolina, Mississippi, and Florida-the Constitution
was not merely silent, but contained affirmative provisions that would
be authoritatively interpreted to prohibit racial-endogamy laws.01 In
Louisiana, where the legislature would formally repeal the statute a
199. Editorial, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER (Tenn.), Mar. 29, 1866, at 2 (reporting an
overwhelming vote against a measure introduced by a "radical" representative from St.
Louis), available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85033395/1866-03-29/ed-1/seq-
2/.
200. BOND, No EASY WALK, supra note 151, at 131 (noting that the South Carolina
convention was "dominated by black Republicans" and "declined to include any
prohibition against interracial marriage"); JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, 1868, at 199-200 (1871)
(showing a rejection of such a prohibition by an overwhelming vote of 10 to 55); DEBATES
AT ARKANSAS CONVENTION, supra note 159, at 489, 500, 504, 507; OFFICIAL JOURNAL
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA HELD IN THE
CITY OF MONTGOMERY, COMMENCING ON TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 5TH, A.D. 1867, at
189 (1868), available at http://www.legislature.state.al.us/misc/history/acts-and
journals/1867_Journals/1867ConventionJournalfulldocument.html; BOND, NO EASY
WALK, supra note 151, at 108-09 (noting that the "Republican-dominated convention"
rejected proposals concerning interracial marriages); JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE PEOPLE OF GEORGIA, 1868, at 64, 148
(1868) (showing a proposed constitutional prohibition, but not included in the final draft,
as well as a proposed ordinance, rejected because out of order); JOURNAL OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, 1868, at 216
(1868) (noting that a proposal to constitutionally prohibit interracial marriages was laid on
the table).
201. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 39 (1868) (providing that "Distinction on account of race or
color, in any case whatever, shall be prohibited, and all classes of citizens shall enjoy
equally all common, public, legal and political privileges."); CHARLES F. ROBINSON II,
DANGEROUS LIAISONS: SEX AND LOVE IN THE SEGREGATED SOUTH 29 (2003) (noting
this provision's implicit abrogation of the South Carolina law); FLA. CONST. OF 1868, art
XVI, § 28 ("There shall be no civil or political distinction in this State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude") for a discussion of the subsequent statutory
repeal, motivated by this clause, see infra text accompanying note 256; Dickerson v.
Brown, 49 Miss. 357, 374 (1873) (affirming that "[w]ith the adoption of the present [state]
constitution [in December 1869], former impediments to marriage between whites and
blacks ceased"). In 1870, before this decision, the Mississippi legislature had passed an act
that "forever repealed" all "black codes," including the racial endogamy statutes.
WALLENSTEIN, supra note 107, at 59. Soon after this repeal, a member of the Mississippi
senate married an African-American woman. Editorial, Miscegenation-A White Senator
of Mississippi Marries a Colored Lady-The Ceremonies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1870, at 5;
Ronald E. Butchart, Edmonia G, and Carolina V. Highgate: Black Teachers, Freed Slaves,
and the Betrayal of Black Hearts, in PORTRAITS OF AFRICAN AMERICAN LIFE SINCE
1865, at 1, 9 (Nina Mjagkij ed., 2003).
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few months later,20 the delegates likewise included provisions
repudiating racial discrimination. In Arkansas, the delegates at the
convention seemed to assume that constitutional silence would signify
legal permission, for they spoke as if the old statutory provision had
already been abrogated,' an abrogation later confirmed by the
conspicuous omission of the statute from the state's 1873 code.05 In
the two others-Georgia and Alabama-constitutional silence
effectively repealed the existing constitutional prohibitions of the
1865 constitutions;2°6 however, the extant statutory bans seemingly
survived, but somewhat precariously in Alabama°7 and somewhat
dubiously in Georgia.28 Only in North Carolina did the convention
202. See supra note 195.
203. LA. CONST. arts. 2,100 (1868).
204. DEBATES AT ARKANSAS CONVENTION, supra note 159, at 489-507 (suggesting
the absence, in 1868, of any extant local racial-endogamy law).
205. WALLENSTEIN, supra note 107, at 80; DIGEST OF THE STATUTES OF ARKANSAS,
ch. 92, §§ 4171-4191 (Edward W. Gantt ed., 1874) (conspicuously omitting any racial-
endogamy rules). There is one newspaper account of a legislative repeal in 1869, but I
have not been able to find any corroborating evidence. FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER
(Tenn.), Mar. 4, 1869, at 2, available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85033395/
1869-03-04/ed-1/seq-2/ (denouncing the "carpet-bag legislature of Arkansas" for
"repeal[ing] all laws preventing the intermarriage of blacks and whites").
206. GA. CONST., art. V, § 1, cl. 9 (1865) ("The marriage relation between white
persons and persons of African descent, is forever prohibited, and such marriage shall be
null and void; and it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to enact laws for the
punishment of any officer who shall knowingly issue a license for the celebration of such
marriage, and any officer or minister of the gospel who shall marry such persons
together"). ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 31 (1865) ("It shall be the duty of the General
Assembly, at its next session, and from time to time thereafter as it may deem proper, to
enact laws prohibiting the intermarriage of white persons with negroes, or with persons of
mixed blood, declaring such marriages null and void ab initio, and making the parties to
any such marriage subject to criminal prosecutions, with such penalties as may be by law
prescribed."). See also W. E. B. Du Bois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 1860-
1880, at 492 (1935) (indicating that white delegates in Alabama initially favored such a
provision overwhelmingly, but were persuaded by black delegates' objections).
207. In Alabama, however, during the 1868-69 session, soon after ratification, one or
both houses of the Alabama legislatures reportedly voted to repeal the vestigial statute.
Editorial, THE WEEKLY ARIZONA MINER, Feb. 6, 1869, at 2, available at
http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn82014899/1869-2-O6/ed-l/seq-2/ (reporting that
the "carpet-baggers" in the Alabama legislature had voted to repeal "all laws forbidding
the intermarriage of blacks and whites"); Editorial, THE PULASKI CITIZEN (Tenn.), Dec.
25, 1868, at 2, available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85033964/1868-12-25/ed.
1/seq-2/ (containing two reports, one that the whole legislature had voted to repeal the
statute, another that lower house only had so voted). The state's supreme court would
soon thereafter nullify the law as unconstitutional in 1872. Burns, 48 Ala. at 197-98.
208. In Georgia, the new constitution's bill of rights declared, "[t]he social status of
the citizen shall never be the subject of legislation." GA. CONST., art. I, § 11 (1868). This
provision was subject to two opposing interpretations: some claimed it abolished all racial-
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expressly reassure citizens of the preservation of the status quo ante:
The convention's cover letter insisted that interracial marriage could
still "be regulated by the representatives of the people in the General
Assembly. ,21
In light of Republicans' nationwide hostility to enforced racial-
endogamy, Democrats understandably charged them with racial
radicalism. On the eve of the Amendment's full ratification, one
newspaper alleged that Republicans had moved decisively in favor of
extending the right of intermarriage to blacks: "It is past denial now
that the Radical party is in favor of 'impartial suffrage'-more than
this, in favor of extending to the blacks the same rights and privileges
exercised by the whites," including the right to "intermarry with the
whites," and "and all things by law or custom tolerated in or
conferred upon the white race."21
Fourth, while the Amendment was still pending, several
prominent Democrats and Republicans outside Congress concluded
that racial-endogamy laws were invalid under the very statute that the
Amendment was (partly) designed to constitutionalize: the recently
adopted Civil Rights Act-despite the contrary reassurances made
during the statute's adoption.2 1' As Horace Flack noted in his classic
study, while the Amendment was pending, there was a widespread,
though not "prevalent," belief that the Act had "permitted the
intermarriage of the races.2 12 Most notably, the Kentucky Supreme
Court concluded that the Act was unconstitutional in 1867, in part
because its allegedly extreme effects included the abrogation of state
racial-endogamy laws."3
endogamy laws, while others claimed that it would prevent the legislature from altering
any existing legislation. Editorial, Judge Irwin the Anti-Radical Candidate for Governor-
Prospects of the Canvass-Candidates for Congress-Crops, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1868,
available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F50D1FFF3C54lB
7 4 93 C
7A9178FD85F4C8684F9. A year later, the state supreme court endorsed the latter
interpretation. Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321, 324 (1869).
209. JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NORTH
CAROLINA, 1868, at 485 (1868).
210. Editorial, The Radical Party and the Negro, PUBLIC LEDGER (Memphis), June
13, 1868, at 1, available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn850336
73/186 8-06-13/ed-
1/seq-1/ (reprinting the editorial from the Cairo Democrat).
211. See supra note 152.
212. HORACE EDGAR FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
54 (1906).
213. Bowlin v. Commonwealth, 65 Ky. 5, 9 (1867). In 1869, Judge Joseph Crockett, of
California's Supreme Court, would reach the same conclusion. People v. Washington, 36
Cal. 658, 681 (1869) (Crockett, J., dissenting). Cf. Editorial, Working of the Civil Rights
Bill, THE NASHVILLE DAILY UNION, Apr. 6, 1866, at 1, available at http://chronicling
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As Flack emphasized, this conclusion was not limited to
opponents.214 Indeed, the New York Tribune (not surprisingly)
decried a criminal prosecution in Tennessee and hoped that the case
would be "taken up by the United States Supreme Court for
adjudication under the Civil Rights Act." '215 The New Orleans
Tribune, owned by African Americans, insisted that the Act
effectively struck the word "white" from all state statutes, and thus
entitled citizens to "[c]ertificates of marriage" even "when husband
and wife belong to different races."'216 At the Alabama constitutional
convention, the Civil Rights Act provided the leading basis for
opposing the prohibition on such marriages.217 In trial courts from
Maine to Mississippi, defendants repeatedly, though unsuccessfully,
invoked the Act to defend themselves against local racial-endogamy
laws; in response, radical Republicans frequently declared their
exasperation and intent to bring an appeal to the Supreme Court."'
But in North Carolina, military authorities intervened to permit
interracial marriage despite local statutory law, seemingly because of
america.loc.gov/lccn/sn83025718/1866-04-06/ed-1/seq-1/ (objecting that any clergyman who
obeyed a local racial-endogamy law would violate the Civil Rights Act); accord Editorial,
The Proceedings of the Rump Congress, The Vinton Record (Ohio), Sept. 27, 1866, at 3,
available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85038222/ 1866-09-27/ed-1/seq-3/.
214. FLACK, supra note 212, at 42 (noting that the statements that the Act would
nullify racial-endogamy laws "may seem extreme" [in 1906] but in 1866 were not "limited
to opponents of the bill and partisan newspapers").
215. Amalgamation in Nashville, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1866, at 4 (quoting and
criticizing the Tribune for making "[s]ocial equality" the newspaper's "mission").
216. BOND, No EASY WALK, supra note 151, at 78.
217. Editorial, Marriage Between White and Black Citizens, THE EVENING
TELEGRAPH (Philadelphia), Dec. 10, 1867, at 2, available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.
gov/lccn/sn83025925/1867-12-10/ed-1/seq-2/.
218. FLACK, supra note 212, at 43 (discussing a Mississippi prosecution); JAMES
WILFORD GARNER, RECONSTRUCTION IN MISSISSIPPI 114 n.2 (1902) (same); Editorial,
Miscegenation, THE DAILY PHOENIX (Columbia, S.C.), July 31, 1866, at 3, available at
http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84027008/1866-O7-31/ed-l/seq-3/ (discussing a
Virginia defendant's unsuccessful argument); Editorial, Miscegenation in Knoxville,
NASHVILLE UNION AND AMERICAN, Dec. 19, 1868, at 1, available at http://chronicling
america.loc.gov/lccn/sn85033699/1868-12-19/ed-1/seq-l/ (reporting the prosecution of John
and Maria Gadshaw and their unsuccessful invocation of the Act); Editorial, Repudiation
of the Civil Rights Bill in Maine, THE PLYMOUTH WEEKLY DEMOCRAT, Aug. 29, 1867, at
2, available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn8705 6248/1867-08-29/ed-1/seq-2/
(reprinting the Boston Post article about a prosecution in Maine and Radicals'
exasperation with the judge's decision); PASCOE, supra note 17, at 50 (noting the Indiana
prosecution); Editorial, News in Brief, THE ANDERSON INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 25, 1867, at
2 (reporting a planned appeal).
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the Act219-which marriages were subsequently ratified by an
ordinance adopted by the North Carolina constitutional convention2
Fifth, during the ratification debates, some Republicans were not
silent but acknowledged the threat the Amendment posed to racial-
endogamy laws. As noted above, at the Arkansas constitutional
convention, the Republican majority successfully opposed any
constitutional ban." One of the opponents' main arguments was that
a prohibition would violate Section 1 of the pending Amendment,
and more specifically the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Two
delegates made this argument,"' with one delegate adding that
"Congress will reject any constitution, containing such a 
provision. ' 23
No one expressly opposed this interpretation of the Clause. The only
explicit disagreement came from a delegate who noted that the
Amendment had not yet been ratified.224 Still, at least one supporter
of the pending Amendment implied that its ratification would not
affect such laws.225
During the 1866 campaign, Indiana's Governor Oliver Morton
offered a similar interpretation. He declared that Section 1 would
ensure that "without regard to color," each man "shall have the same
219. J.W. Smith, All Human Blood Is Alike-Intermarriage, in JOHN JAMES HOLM,
HOLM'S RACE ASSIMILATION, OR THE FADING LEOPARD'S SPOTS 511, 518 (1910)
(recounting story of 1866 intermarriage sanctioned by military authorities); JOSEPH
GRtGOIRE DE ROULHAC HAMILTON, RECONSTRUCTION IN NORTH CAROLINA 234
(1914) (noting that military authorities declared in early 1868 that the refusal of marriage
licenses to a man and woman of different races to be "a violation of United States law");
cf Editorial, The Marriage Question, THE CHARLESTON DAILY NEWS, Sept. 22, 1869, at
4, available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84026994/1
869-09-2 2/ed-l/seq-4 /
(discussing a post-ratification appeal made to military authorities in Virginia).
220. HOLM, supra note 219, at 518; An Ordinance in Relation to Marriages
Authorized by Military Authority, in CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NORTH-
CAROLINA: TOGETHER WITH THE ORDINANCES AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, ASSEMBLED IN THE CITY OF RALEIGH, JAN. 14TH,
1868, at 86 (1868); JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF
NORTH CAROLINA, 1868, at 462, 473 (1868) (indicating that this ordinance was
controversially designed to preserve the validity of certain interracial marriages).
221. See supra note 200.
222. DEBATES AT ARKANSAS CONVENTION, supra note 159, at 377, 502-04 (remarks
of Miles Langley & James Hodges). Hodges also cited the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV. Id. at 502.
223. Id. at 377 (remark of Miles Langley). Indeed, none of the Southern states had
such constitutional provisions at the time of readmission.
224. Id. at 377 (remarks of J.N. Cypert).
225. William Grey, for instance, an African-American delegate, stated that he could,
in theory support such a statute provided whites and blacks were subject to truly equal
punishments for interracial marriage. Id. at 374, 492.
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right to enjoy his life and property, to have his family protected.226 In
response to charges that such equality would involve black suffrage
and interracial marriage, Morton emphatically denied the former, but
ridiculed the latter fear, saying that opponents of interracial equality
"seem to think that the negro will certainly marry their daughter
unless there is some law made to prevent it [laughter] . . . Why the
thing of marrying and being married I always understood was a
question of consent and taste.227 Morton praised those "[s]tates in
the North," and Massachusetts in particular, where "amalgamation is
almost entirely unknown, [but] where you degrade him, and where
you destroy the marriage relation, [amalgamation] has taken place
between the two races, and that is the only place it ever will."
'28
Governor Morton thereby acknowledged that by granting equal
familial rights to all citizens, "without regard to color," the
Amendment would nullify state racial-endogamy laws by granting to
free blacks nationwide the equal citizenship that they had long
enjoyed in Massachusetts. But like some delegates at the Arkansas
convention,22' he (dubiously) reassured his audience that such equal
citizenship would decrease actual interracial sex and fecundity.
In sum, the discussion of interracial marriage, in connection with
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, roughly followed the
same pattern found in the antebellum debates over black citizenship.
Opponents of black citizenship again insisted that free blacks'
enjoyment of the status and privileges of citizenship would invalidate
racial-endogamy laws. Some proponents of multiracial citizenship
demurred (at least impliedly), but others plainly agreed with
opponents. Still, many proponents treated the issue with deafening
silence-but a silence that can best be interpreted as tacit agreement
with opponents.
226. Speech of Governor Morton, at Anderson, Madison County, Ind., Sept. 22, 1866,
in CAMPAIGN SPEECHES, supra note 164, at 35.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Supra text accompanying notes 159-60.
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III. Post-Ratification Interpretation: the Absence, Repeal, and
Non-Enforcement of Racial-Endogamy Laws in Republican-
Leaning States
Perhaps the evidence most commonly offered to show the
conflict between Loving and originalism is the alleged fact that even
after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, states generally
prohibited interracial marriage. The majority in Casey, for instance,
affirmed that "interracial marriage was illegal in most States in the
19th century.'23  In Loving itself, counsel for Virginia made the
prominent factual claim-neither rebutted nor even mentioned by
either opposing counsel or the Court-that "a majority of the States
which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment still maintained and
enforced their anti-miscegenation laws as late as 1950.231
If true, this evidence would strongly support the conclusion that,
according to contemporaneous public officials, neither the
Amendment nor anything in the Constitution, prevented the states
from making or enforcing a racial-endogamy prohibition. Otherwise,
as Lincoln would say, state officials' "fidelity to correct principle, and
their oath to support the Constitution, would have constrained them
to oppose the prohibition.,
232
But as we shall see, it is simply not true that "interracial marriage
was illegal in most states" in the decade following the Fourteenth
Amendment. Indeed, by 1873, within five years of the Amendment's
ratification, racial-endogamy laws either did not exist or were not in
force, in both a clear majority of states and a super-majority of the
states that had ratified the Amendment. The absence of enforced
racial-endogamy largely resulted from the conclusion of Republican
officials-including almost every Republican judge to face the
question before Slaughter-House was decided in 1873-that the
230. Casey, 505 U.S. at 847-48; see also, EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869, at 75 (1990) (stating that racial-endogamy
laws "were common, even in the northern states").
231. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Appellee,
in 16 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 794, 799 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975); see also Statement of
Appellee Opposing Jurisdiction and Motion to Affirm, in id. at 717, 726 (contending that
"those States which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment clearly signified their intent by
continuation of their anti-miscegenation laws contemporaneously with the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment").
232. Abraham Lincoln, Address at Cooper Institute, New York City, Feb. 27, 1860, in
3 COLLECTED WORKS 522, 527 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
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Amendment and/or the Civil Rights Act precluded the making or
enforcing of such laws.
A. Racial-Endogamy Laws in Republican States
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause did not require any state to
affirmatively repeal any law. The Clause prohibited the making or
enforcing of certain laws. As to any pre-existing law, then,
compliance required only non-enforcement. So in assessing the post-
ratification evidence, it is important to distinguish those states where
an unrepealed statute was unenforced.
Fortunately for our inquiry, a contemporary-Nebraska Probate
Judge Robert Townsend-undertook a multistate survey to identify
those states that still enforced racial endogamy in 1873. After
refusing a marriage license to an interracial couple, consistent with
Nebraska's law,"' Judge Townsend took "some pains to ascertain, as
far as possible from official sources, the law in all the States
concerning the intermarriage of whites and blacks."'234 His widely
published survey concluded that, in 1873, "such intermarriages are
now valid" in both the District of Columbia and eighteen states,
namely, "New York, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas, New
Jersey, South Carolina, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana,
Texas, [and] Arkansas."'235 Furthermore, officials from three other
233. GREATER OMAHA GENEALOGICAL SOCIETY AND FRIENDS, DOUGLAS
COUNTY, NEBRASKA MARRIAGES, 1854-1881, at 53 (2002). In a published comment,
Townsend sarcastically urged the couple to obtain a license in neighboring Iowa, where,
he said, the Republican governor's daughter could (and should) marry a black husband.
Townsend was a Democrat, or at least an anti-Republican. In this comment, he mockingly
referred to the Republican Party as the "God and Equality" party; a local Republican
newspaper ridiculed him for publishing this partisan advice, which ridicule led to first
verbal, then physical altei-cations between local newspaper editors. DAVID L. BRISTOW,
A DIRTY, WICKED TOWN: TALES OF 19TH CENTURY OMAHA 95-103 (2000).
234. Editorial, Mixed Marriages, NASHVILLE UNION AND AMERICAN, Oct. 3, 1873, at
3, col. 3, available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85033699/1873-10-02/ed-
1/seq-2/.
235. Id. The report was widely reprinted. See, e.g., Editorial, Political Paragraphs,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1873, available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-
free/pdf?res=FA0814F7395D1A7493CBAB1782D85F478784F9; Editorial, VERMONT
PHOENIX, Oct. 17, 1873, at 1, col. 7, available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn
98060050/1873-10-17/ed-1/seq-1l/; Editorial, Intermarriage of Whites and Blacks, THE
DAILY PHOENIX (Columbia, S.C.), Oct. 7, 1873, at 1, col. 1, available at http://chronicling
america.loc.gov/lccn/sn84027008/1873-10-07/ed-1/seq-1/; Editorial, THE ANDREW
COUNTY REPUBLICAN (Savannah, Mo.), Nov. 7, 1873, at 4, col. 3, available at
http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85034076/1873-11-07/ed-l/seq-4/.
[Vol. 42:2
states-Maine, Michigan, and Illinois-reported that "although they
have prohibitory statutes, yet the law with them is a dead letter, and
that 'such marriages frequently occur.'
236
Judge Townsend's conclusion as to the repeal or judicial
nullification in seven ex-confederate states has been confirmed by
Peter Wallenstein's recent scholarship.237  Additionally, my own
research corroborates Judge Townsend's findings as to the post-1868
non-enforcement of the unrepealed laws in Maine Michigan, and
236. Mixed Marriages, supra note 234, at 3.
237. WALLENSTEIN supra note 107, at 80.
238. Even before repeal in 1883, contemporaries spoke of the Maine law in the past
tense. See 4 GEORGE HOMER EMERSON, MEMOIR OF EBENEZER FISHER, D.D. 237 n.1
(1880) (noting that "[a]t that time," i.e., before the Civil War, "the laws of Maine
prohibited the intermarriage of white and colored persons."). The New Orleans Democrat
accused radicals of hypocrisy, for although enforcement in Virginia and Indiana had
occasioned "much hostile comment in the Radical press," the radicals' own "strongholds"
of Maine and Michigan retained these laws on the books; the Democrat thus tacitly
indicated that these unrepealed laws were not enforced. Editorial, THE LAFAYETTE
ADVERTISER, June 14, 1879, at 2, available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn
86079068/1879-06-14/ed-1/seq-2/ (quoting the Democrat's editorial). A Maryland court
granted a divorce to a white woman (Emma Harrington) married in Maine in 1879 to a
mixed-race husband (Robert Fearing), but it is unclear whether the court relied on Maine
law or Maryland law to find invalidity. Compare Editorial, ST. PAUL DAILY GLOBE, Aug.
19, 1884, at 4, available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn90059522/1884-08-19/ed-
1/seq-4/ (attributing the decision to the court's enforcement of Maine law) with Editorial,
Divorced from a Mulatto, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1884, available at http://query.nytimes.com/
mem/archive-free/pdf?res=FAOD16FB355F5738DDDAF0894D0405B8484FOD3
(attributing the divorce to the judge's application of Maryland law). In an 1871 case, the
Maine Supreme Court cited the antebellum law, but did so with reference to a marriage
between parties who died before the war, and the nullity of whose marriage was a matter
of res judicata. Inhabitants of Raymond v. Inhabitants of N. Berwick, 60 Me. 114, 117
(1871) (noting the invalidity of the marriage between a pauper's black grandfather and
white grandmother, by force of the antebellum decision in Bailey v. Fiske, 34 Me. 77
(1852)).
239. The first successful postbellum prosecution under Michigan's law seemingly
occurred in 1882 in Detroit; contemporaries viewed the enforcement as anomalous, given
that there were 100 or so interracial couples living in Detroit alone. Editorial,
Miscegenation, DUBUQUE HERALD, Aug. 13, 1882, at 3, available at http://news.google.
com/newspapers?nid=uh8FjlLnQOkC&dat=18820813&printsec=frontpage&hl=en
(reporting the prosecution of a "colored man and a white woman, both entirely
respectable and worthy," under an "old law" and that the couple, like hundred or so
couples in Detroit, have been "living together some time in marriage relation"). David
Katzman cites an 1859 prosecution and an initial effort in 1874, but the latter prosecution
was abandoned when no witness was available to verify that the marriage had been
contracted in Michigan. The state's statute prohibited the making and not the
performance of the marital agreement, so if married in another state or Canada, interracial
couples could live validly as husband and wife in Michigan. DAVID M. KATZMAN,
BEFORE THE GHETTO: BLACK DETROIT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 92 (1973).
Katzman notes that in the 1882 case, even the prosecutor conceded the law might be a
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Illinois.2" Further, in two other Northern states he did not mention,
Rhode Island and Ohio, the unrepealed law was also a (virtual) dead
letter. In Rhode Island, the law seemed unenforced,24' and was, in
any case, easy to evade (through marriage in neighboring states).242
The only apparent legal effect was the law's frustration of suits for
breach of a promise to marry.243 In Ohio, the law criminalized only
the making and solemnization of the marital agreement, but did not
invalidate the resulting marriage or criminalize the performance of
the agreement (cohabitation, etc.), for such a marriage remained valid
even if illicitly contracted within the state. Contemporaries called
the statute a "dead letter," and noted the large number of interracial
"relic of barbarism," and the judge sympathetically urged the couple to just go to Canada
to contract the marriage lawfully and then return to Michigan. Id.
240. Illinois had repealed all but the marital provisions of its prior black code by
January 1865. Editorial, The Illinois "Black Laws" They are Repealed by the Illinois
Legislature A History of their Origin, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1865, at 4, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1865/01/26/news/illinois-black-laws-they-are-repealed-iilinois
legislature-history-their-origin.html. Despite this selective retention, I have not found any
record of any enforcement of this statute betwen1866 and the law's repeal in 1874.
241. In 1880, opponents, who had tried for a decade to win full legislative repeal, tried
to bring a test case to obtain a judicial victory, but no prosecution seemed to have
occurred. Editorial, THE COLUMBIAN (Bloomsburg, Pa.), June 25, 1880, at 4 (reporting
the test case of the marriage of Samuel Dorrell and Ellen Carrington, officiated by Rev.
George Smith, who was to be prosecuted); but see Ellen Curington, ANCESTRY.COM,
http://search.ancestry.com/cgi-bin/sse.dll?g=allgs&gsfn=Ellen&gsln=Curington&gss=seo
&ghc=20 (showing the couple's registered marriage) (last visited Mar. 16, 2013); see also
GEORGE HENRY, LIFE OF GEORGE HENRY, TOGETHER WITH A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
COLORED PEOPLE IN AMERICA 74 (1894), available at http://docsouth.unc.edu/neh/henry
g/henryg.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2013) (discussing repeal efforts but conspicuously
omitting to mention prosecutions).
"242. The law was easy to evade by a quick trip to Massachusetts because the state law
did not affect out-of-state marriages. General Assembly: General Session at Providence,
THE PROVIDENCE EVENING PRESS, Mar. 20, 1873, at 3 (reporting comment of Senator
Samuel Currey that the law was thus "utterly useless").
243. General Assembly: February Session-At Providence, THE MORNING HERALD
(Providence), Feb 21, 1873, at 2 ("Reckless young white men in this State have often,
under promise of marriage to mulatto girls, caused their ruin, and the girls or the parents
have no redress under the law.").
244. An Act to Prevent the Amalgamation of the White and Colored Races, § 1, 58
Ohio Laws 6, 6 (1861) (punishing persons who should "intermarry" or "have illicit carnal
knowledge," which implied the legality of licit, marital carnal knowledge); Carmichael v.
State, 12 Ohio St. 553 (1861) (recognizing the validity of common-law marriages); Stewart,
supra note 33, at 234 (noting that Ohio's law did not invalidate interracial marriages,
which remained valid at common law); State v. Bailey, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 455, 455
(Toledo Police Court 1884) (stating that despite the criminal prohibition has "have
nothing to do with the validity of the marriage: we know of no law which invalidates it").
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marriages in the state.45 Before the 1880s, the only enforcement
consisted in the frustration of suits for breach of promise to marry (at
least in one controversial case),24 the occasional, but controversial
denial of licenses,247 and two criminal prosecutions in 1877 that were
summarily dismissed because the trial judges declared the law
unconstitutional.248 The unrepealed but (virtually) unenforced laws of
these five Northern states would be formally repealed in the fourteen
years following Judge Townsend's report: Illinois (1874), Rhode
Island (1881), Maine (1883), Michigan (1883), and Ohio (1887).249
Despite many unrepealed statutes, Judge Townsend's report
shows that within five years of the Fourteenth Amendment's
ratification, racial-endogamy laws either did not exist or were not in
force in 21 states. These states, 21 of the 37, represented a clear
majority of the whole number of states (roughly 57%), and contained
245. FOWLER, supra note 130, at 243 (noting an 1886 report by the Cleveland Gazette
that despite "hundreds" of such marriages, there had been no prosecutions). Fowler says
the Gazette's estimate was "probably an exaggeration," id., but a contemporary later
recalled, "the old law was largely a dead letter, for many cases of intermarriage ... took
place before its repeal [1887], and we have never heard of a prosecution in Ohio before its
repeal." 2 LANDON C. BELL, THE OLD FREE STATE: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE
HISTORY OF LUNENBURG COUNTY AND SOUTHSIDE VIRGINIA 20 (1927). But there was
one successful prosecution in Toledo in 1884. See infra note 359.
246. See infra text accompanying notes 275-80.
247. See, e.g., Editorial, THE STARK COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Apr. 28, 1869, at 2,
available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84028490/1869-04-28/ed-1/seq-2/
(noting that a probate judge had denied a license to a couple in Perry, Ohio, but decrying
the fact that the judge had expressed his deep reluctance to deny the license, and
commenting that judges in more Republican areas, like Oberlin or Akron, probably would
have granted the license); Editorial, "Pure White Blood, Sure!" Amalgamation Nipped in
the Bud by a Cincinnati Judge-A Nashville Girl the Intended Bride, PUBLIC LEDGER
(Memphis), May 23, 1870, at 1, available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccni/sn
85033673/1870-05-23/ed-1/seq-1/ (reporting a denial of a license by Probate Judge George
Hoeffer); Editorial, Amalgamation Advocated, THE CHARITON DEMOCRAT (Iowa), May
31, 1870, at 3, available at http://newspaperarchive.com/chariton-democrat/1870-05-
31/page-3 (criticizing the Republican-owned Cincinnati Gazette for arguing that the refusal
to grant the license violated the Privileges or Immunities Clause, for marriage was one of
the privileges protected); Editorial, NASHVILLE UNION AND AMERICAN, Sept. 24, 1874,
at 2 (reporting that despite the Ohio law, even in Cincinnati interracial couples
occasionally requested a license); Editorial, Rambler's Notebook, SPRINGFIELD DAILY
REPUBLIC (Ohio), Mar. 5, 1887, at 2 (explaining that before the repeal, there were already
"many cases" of such marriages in Ohio, but that repeal would mean that the parties
would be able to legally solemnize the agreement and procure a license).
248. See infra text accompanying notes 281-84.
249. WALLENSTEIN, supra note 107, at 136.
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roughly 60% of the nation's population.250 If Ohio and Rhode Island,
the two other states where the law was (virtually) a dead letter are
added, the total comes to 62% of the states, containing roughly 70%
of the national population.51  Furthermore, those 23 states
represented nearly 70% of the states (33) that had ratified the
Amendment by 1873.252
At first glance, these 23 states may seem miscellaneous. Yet they
follow a fairly consistent partisan pattern. In the North, the list
included each of the eleven states that supported Fremont in 1856,
and every state, except Indiana, where Abraham Lincoln had
received more than 48% of the vote in 1860, as well as strongly
Republican Kansas (admitted 1861).253 These states might be called
traditional Republican states. In the South, the list included each of
the three states where African Americans formed over 50% of the
population (Louisiana, South Carolina, and Mississippi), and two of
the three states where they constituted 45% to 50% of the population
(Alabama and Florida, but not Georgia).254  These states might be
called the new Republican states-former slave states that had
become predominantly Republican by force of African Americans'
partisan tendencies. In addition, the list included two southern states
where the black population was less than 33% of the whole: Texas
and Arkansas.255  Republican political success, therefore, seems to
have effected a dramatic change in American marriage law. By 1873,
what had been true in a majority of Republican states in 1860 was
now true in a majority of all states as well as the nation's capital:
citizens enjoyed freedom from racial-endogamy laws.
250. These states were allocated 174 of the 283 seats in the House of Representatives
after the 1870 census. Act for the Apportionment of Representatives to Congress Among
the Several States According to the Ninth Census, ch. 11, § 1, 17 Stat. 28, 28 (1872).
251. These 23 states were allocated 196 of the 283 seats in the House after the 1870
census. Id.
252. ROBERTA. BRADY, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AS AMENDED 17 (2007) (listing the states' dates of ratification).
253. In 1864, Lincoln won nearly 80% of the vote in Kansas. ERIK W. AUSTIN &
JEROME M. CLUBB, POLITICAL FACTS OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1789, at 140 (1986).
254. DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION: RACIAL
GERRYMANDERING AND MINORITY INTERESTS IN CONGRESS 19 (1997).
255. Id. at 21 (indicating that blacks constituted between 26% and 31% of the
population in those states). In four of these five states-all but Alabama-legislative
action repealed the law. Peter Wallenstein, Reconstruction, Segregation, and
Miscegenation: Interracial Marriage and the Law in the Lower South, 1865-1900, 6
AMERICAN NINETEENTH CENTURY HISTORY 57, 60 (2005). In Alabama, the
Republican-dominated Supreme Court nullified the law in 1872, but legislative repeal
nearly occurred in 1869. See supra note 207.
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B. Racial Endogamy and Republican Post-Ratification Interpretation
The sheer fact that officials in Republican-leaning states and the
District of Columbia either repealed, failed to make, or failed to
enforce racial-endogamy laws, is not sufficient to demonstrate official
constitutional objection to such laws. Officials can act or refrain from
acting for countless reasons, or even for no reason at all. Still, the
preponderance of the evidence strongly suggests that, in repealing,
not making, or not enforcing racial-endogamy laws, Republican
officials acted for conscious and deliberate reasons, and the most
commonly cited reason was the belief that such laws violated the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Civil Rights Act, or both.
As to executive or legislative motives, only fragmentary evidence
exists; still, the available records indicate widespread concern that
such restrictions were inconsistent with African Americans' rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment and/or the Civil Rights Act. For
example, the Florida legislature attributed its repeal of the state's
intermarriage law to "deference to the opinion of those who think
that they are opposed to our Constitution and to the legislation of
Congress.256 Non-enforcement and repeal (in 1874) of the Illinois
statute likewise reflected a widespread opinion that the Amendment
abrogated the laws.57 In Rhode Island's legislature, where repeal
finally occurred in 1881,258 opponents routinely objected that such
laws violated the letter and spirit of the Reconstruction
256. WALLENSTEIN, supra note 107, at 80 (citing and quoting from A DIGEST OF THE
STATUTE LAW OF FLORIDA OF A GENERAL AND PUBLIC CHARACTER, IN FORCE UP TO
THE FIRST DAY OF JANUARY, 1872, at 578, note q (1872)). It is possible, if not probable,
that "our Constitution" referred to the Florida constitution's comprehensive prohibition
on governmental racial discrimination. FLA. CONST. OF 1868, art XVI, § 28 ("There shall
be no civil or political distinction in this State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude... ").
257. Editorial, A Question of Color, THE INTER OCEAN (Chicago), Mar. 1, 1884, at 4,
available at http://www.newspapers.com/newspage/32697310/ (reporting that "the
unanimous sentiment" of a sample of Chicago lawyers is "that such a law 'conflicts with
the fourteenth amendment and is unconstitutional"'). The article further notes "Judge
Bradwell['s]" remark that Illinois's law "was wiped out by the general legislation." The
Judge Bradwell quoted here was almost certainly Judge James Bradwell, husband to Myra
(of Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873) fame), and a member of the legislature from
1873 to 1877 that had repealed the law in 1874. Hon. James B. Bradwell, ALBUM OF
GENEALOGY AND BIOGRAPHY, COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 134, 135 (4th ed., 1896).
258. General Assembly: January Session at Providence, THE PROVIDENCE EVENING
PRESS, Jan. 19, 1881, at 4 (noting that the legislature had referred to committee "the usual
annual petition" to repeal the law).
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Amendments.25 9 In Rhode Island's senate, for instance, Samuel
Currey insisted that the Constitution prohibited the making of any
law that represented "an abridgement of a civil right," such as the
state's racial-endogamy law.2"' In Indiana in 1873, a Democratic
senator, pursuant to a petition "from certain colored citizens," urged
repeal on similar grounds: that "justice to twenty thousand of our
fellow citizens in this state" required repeal; freedom to all, regardless
of color "was the inevitable result of the Fourteenth Amendment."26'
Among the citizens at large, public opinion seemed to have
moved significantly against racial-endogamy laws, in part from the
conviction that the privileges of American citizenship included the
right to intermarry.262 Methodist Bishop Gilbert Haven, long an
advocate of racial equality, celebrated the "enormous" change in
Maryland public opinion during the prior decade (albeit from violent
intolerance to merely general disapproval).26 ' As one Southern
newspaper complained, "[t]en years ago, the most reckless
miscegenist did not dream of the progress which public opinion has
made toward the consummation of his aims."' 6'  In Tennessee, a
convention of African Americans denounced a miscegenation
prosecution as unconstitutional, for the black defendant's "marriage
was in conformity with his privilege as an American citizen.,
265
According to one author, "all" agreed that the rights that "the United
States guaranties to all citizens," included not only those enumerated
259. Editorial, THE STARK COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Mar. 2, 1870, at 1, available at
http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84028490/1870-03-02/ed-1/seq-1/ (attributing
repeal efforts to interpreting the Amendments to require "social equality"); General
Assembly: February Session-At Providence, THE MORNING HERALD (Providence), Feb.
21, 1873, at 2 (reporting comments of Mr. Ames of Providence, that it was opposed to the
"spirit" of the Constitution to say to a portion of the people, "[y]ou may not marry with
the American people").
260. Editorial, General Assembly: General Session at Providence, THE PROVIDENCE
EVENING PRESS, Mar. 20, 1873, at 3 (reporting comment of Senator Currey).
261. FOWLER, supra note 130, at 268.
262. Editorial, THE CHARITON DEMOCRAT (Iowa), May 31, 1870, at 3, available at
http://newspaperarchive.com/chariton-democrat/1870-05-31/page-3 (criticizing the
Republican-owned Cincinnati Gazette for arguing that the refusal to grant the license
violated the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
263. PRENTICE, supra note 161, at 409-10.
264. Gen. Beauregard and His Platform, THE PULASKI CITIZEN (Tenn.), July 17, 1873,
at 2, available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85033964/1873-07-17/ed-1/seq-2/
(last visited Sept. 25, 2013).
265. Editorial, The Negro Ultimatum, NASHVILLE UNION AND AMERICAN, Apr. 30,
1874, at 4, available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85033699/1874-04-30/ed-
1/seq-4/.
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in the Civil Rights Act, but also the following freedoms: "to be free
from inequality of taxation, to intermarry with citizens, to engage in
any profession or trade, when qualified" as well as some rights under
federal statutory law.2
It was in the courts, however, where the reason for opposition to
racial-endogamy laws was most frequently recorded. And the
evidence here is decisive: before April 1873, virtually every
Republican judge to address the issue concluded that such laws
violated the Fourteenth Amendment and/or the Civil Rights Act.
This conclusion was reached by Republican trial judges in Indiana,267t " 269! 27'07
Mississippi,2'6 North Carolina,6  Louisiana, and Texas.271 In reported
266. A. 0. Wright, Citizenship-State and National, 4 WIS. J. ED. 53, 55 (1874)
(emphasis added).
267. PASCOE, supra note 17, at 50, 54-55 (discussing the case of Gibson, 36 Ind. 389,
where Gibson was represented by former Judge Andrew Robinson, and that his successor
Judge Charles Butterfield had quashed the indictment). Butterfield was a Republican,
and a veteran of Sherman's march to the sea. LAWRENCE M. LIPIN, PRODUCERS,
PROLETARIANS, AND POLITICIANS: WORKERS AND PARTY POLITICS IN EVANSVILLE
AND NEW ALBANY, INDIANA, 1850-87, at 146 (1994); PASCOE supra note 17, at 50;
JOSEPH PETER ELLIOTT, A HISTORY OF EVANSVILLE AND VANDERBURGH COUNTY,
INDIANA 146 (1897). Butterfield quashed the indictment almost certainly for the same
reasons later set forth in Robinson's argument before the Indiana Supreme Court. See
Gibson, 36 Ind. at 390 (quoting argument of Robinson that "all the laws of this State
prohibiting the marrying of blacks and whites are abrogated by the fourteenth amendment
to the constitution of the United States, and the law of Congress passed in pursuance to
that amendment, which, in express terms, confers upon colored people the power of
making contracts.").
268. Editorial, EVENING STAR (D.C.), Oct. 4, 1869, at 3, available at
http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83045462/1869-10-04/ed-1/seq-
3/ (reporting Judge
[Robert] Leachman's decision that the Civil Rights Act had abrogated Mississippi's law);
Editorial, MEMPHIS DAILY APPEAL, Oct. 15,1869, at 2 (denouncing a "Mississippi carpet-
bagger Judge" for this decision). For a biography of Judge Leach, see ALFRED JOHN
BROWN, HISTORY OF NEWTON COUNTY, MiSsISSIPPI: FROM 1834 TO 1894, at 376-377
(1894).
269. State v. Reinhardt, 63 N.C. 547, 547-48 (1869) (stating that the trial judge, Judge
Logan of Lincoln County, had instructed the jury to enter a verdict of not guilty because
the parties were lawfully married, and indicating that the trial judge's instruction involved
the same claim at issue in State v. Hairston, 63 N.C. 451 (1869)). Hairston involved the
argument that the Civil Rights Act had nullified North Carolina's racial-endogamy law.
Hairston, 63 N.C. at 453. Judge George W. Logan was a strongly pro-Reconstruction
Republican, whose opponents alleged that he "would decide in favor of the negro every
time." JOHN WERTHEIMER, LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE SOUTH: A HISTORY OF NORTH
CAROLINA COURT CASES 33 (2009). Logan had been a member of the Confederate
Congress, but remained consistently pro-peace, anti-war, and pro-Union. Allen W.
Trelease, Logan, George Washington, 4 DICTIONARY OF NORTH CAROLINA BIOGRAPHY
83, 83 (William Stevens Powell ed., 1991).
270. Hart v. Hoss & Elder, 26 La. Ann. 90 (1874) (noting that the trial judge had been
Judge Smith of Caddo Parrish); Editorial, Personal, Political, and General, N.Y. TIMES,
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cases, the six judges of the Texas and Alabama supreme courts
likewise unanimously held that the Fourteenth Amendment had
abrogated state racial-endogamy laws. Each of these six judges
were not only Republicans but had remained loyal to the Union
throughout the Civil War. 3
In the Northeastern and Midwestern states, except Indiana, the
general absence of any enforced racial-endogamy statutes gave judges
in the deeply Republican states little opportunity to directly address
the issue, especially in reported appellate cases. The absence of such
cases has fostered the skewed perception of the prevailing national
judicial opinion.2 4  But in Ohio, at least, some abortive efforts to
enforce the law indicated the opinion of Northern Republican jurists.
In spring 1869, an "olive-complexioned" plaintiff sued a man of "pure
white blood" for breach of a contract for marriage.275 Her attorneys
contended not only that she was white, but also that the promised
June 26, 1871, available at http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FloA1lFFE3D5
D1A7493C4AB178DD85F458784F9 (noting such a parish court decision); ALFRED
THEODORE ANDREAS, HISTORY OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS: FROM THE EARLIEST
PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME 702 (1884) (noting that Judge F. M. Smith of Caddo
Parrish was a Pennsylvania native and a Union Army veteran).
271. Bonds v. Foster, 36 Tex. 68 (1872) (affirming the trial judge's finding of a valid
marriage despite the unrepealed antebellum law); PASCOE, supra note 17, at 36 (noting
that the trial judge was Livingston Lindsay, a Republican). Even before judicial
invalidation, the law was unenforced. According to one Democratic newspaper in
Memphis, interracial marriage had become "quite common" in Texas by 1870, and that
the chaplain of the Texas Senate, J. W. Tays, had controversially officiated at such a
wedding in Millican, Texas. Editorial, PUBLIC LEDGER (Memphis), May 31, 1870, at 1,
available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85033673/1870-O-31/ed-l/seq.l/. I
have not found record of any public prosecution.
272. Bonds, 36 Tex. at 69-70 (holding that "the law prohibiting such a marriage [was]
abrogated by the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States"); Burns, 48
Ala. at 197-98 (holding that both the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment
secured citizenship to free blacks and guarantied "the right to make and enforce contracts,
amongst which is that of marriage with any citizen capable of entering into that relation").
273. JULIE LAVONNE NOVKOv, RACIAL UNION: LAW, INTIMACY, AND THE WHITE
STATE IN ALABAMA, 1865-1954, at 46 (2008) (providing brief sketch of the Alabama
Republicans on the Court); ROBINSON, supra note 201, at 31-32 (noting that the Texas
court was "Republican-controlled"); JAMES L. HALEY, THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT: A
NARRATIVE HISTORY, 1836-1986, at 81-82 (2013) (indicating that the three Texas judges,
appointed by a Republican governor, consisted in Lemuel D. Evans, a unionist, Moses B.
Walker, a Union officer from Ohio, and Wesley B. Ogden, a unionist who fled Texas
during the Civil War).
274. See, e.g., FOWLER, supra note 130, at 233-37 (relying on reported cases to
conclude that the "legality of state intermarriage laws" was "clearly" established).
275. Editorial, Miscegenatory: The African versus the Anglo Saxon, A Negro Sues and
Recovers $10,000, MEMPHIS DAILY APPEAL, Mar. 13, 1869, at 1, available at http:!/
chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83045160/1869-03-13/ed-1/seq-1.
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marriage-even if interracial-would be lawful, since Ohio's racial-
endogamy statute had been abrogated by the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Civil Rights Act. 276  Her attorneys were
Republicans Samuel Boltin and Andrew McBurney;277 the former had
been a probate judge in Dayton, while the latter had been
Lieutenant Governor in 1867 and thus presided when Ohio's Senate
ratified the Amendment.279  Although the trial judge allowed the
defendant to plead the woman's race and consequent nullity of the
promised marriage, the jury reportedly assumed the office of judicial
review, tacitly rejected this defense, and awarded the plaintiff
unusually high damages.28°
In the late 1870s, renewed prosecutions in Cadiz and Cleveland
gave Ohio Republican judges another opportunity to address the
issue. Both trial judges held the statute invalid under the
Amendment.2' The judge in heavily Republican Cadiz (the adopted
home of John Bingham, a leading drafter of the Amendment) was
James Patrick, Jr., the son of a "staunch Republican,'"2 with various
indirect connections to Bingham.283 In Cleveland, the trial judge was
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Boltin, Samuel, in 1 A Biographical Cyclopedia and Portrait Gallery of
Distinguished Men, with a Historical Sketch of the State of Ohio 214-15 (1880).
279. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
1787-1820, at 678 (1894).
280. Id.
281. Editorial, BELMONT CHRONICLE (Ohio), July 19, 1877, at 3, available at
http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85026241/1877-07-19/ed-1/seq-3/ (reporting that
Judge Patrick in Cadiz had concluded that "the law was superseded by the 14th
Amendment and the Civil Rights Bill"); Ohio News Items, PERRYSBURG JOURNAL
(Ohio), Dec. 14, 1877, at 1, available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn8707
6843/1877-12-14/ed-1/seq-1/ (reporting that Probate Judge Tilden in Cleveland had
dismissed an indictment against a minister for solemnizing an interracial marriage, on the
grounds that the Ohio law "is unconstitutional and void on the ground that it strikes at a
natural and sacred right").
282. JOHN BRAINARD MANSFIELD, THE HISTORY OF TUSCARAWAS COUNTY, OHIO
377 (1884); Judge Abraham W. Patrick, in PORTRAIT AND BIOGRAPHICAL RECORD OF
GUERNSEY COUNTY, OHIO 341 (1895).
283. Judge Patrick's father had apparently been a client of Bingham's two decades
earlier. Steubenville & Ind. R.R. Co. v. Patrick, 7 Ohio St. 170, 171 (1857) (indicating that
Bingham represented "James Patrick" of Tuscarawas County in the case). Judge Patrick
had held, from 1866 to 1870, the same position as county prosecutor that Bingham had
held twenty years earlier. MANSFIELD, supra note 282, at 366.
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Daniel Tilden, a veteran anti-slavery lawyer and former comrade of
Joshua Giddings and Salmon Chase.
Although fairly broad, this post-ratification (1868-1873)
Republican judicial consensus was not very deep. Only a handful of
Republican judges published elaborations of their interpretation.
Even in published reports, the judges rarely identified the precise
relevant clause of the Constitution, whether the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, or otherwise.M
5
One major exception to this judicial silence was the extended
opinion of Alabama's Supreme Court in Burns v. State.86 That court,
speaking through Justice Benjamin Saffold, held Alabama's law void
under both the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment's
Privileges or Immunities Clause.27  As to the statute, Saffold
concluded that (1) marriage was a "contract," and (2) that laws
prohibiting blacks from forming marital contracts with white citizens
denied African Americans the "same right" to contract enjoyed by
white citizens.2
This statutory right, Safford elaborated, was also a constitutional
"privilege of citizenship."' 89 In this regard, Saffold marshaled the
authority of Chief Justice Taney, who had opined that if free blacks
could not intermarry with the white citizenry, they could not belong
to that citizenry.290 Two years before Burns, Senate Democrats had
recycled Taney's argument to claim that Mississippi Senator-elect
Hiram Revels had not been a "citizen of the United States" until 1868
and thus could not satisfy the nine-year durational citizenship
284. Robert Sue Alexander, The Willson Era: The Inception of the Northern District of
Ohio, 1855-67, in JUSTICE AND LEGAL CHANGE ON THE SHORES OF LAKE ERIE: A
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
OHIO 15, 23 (Paul Finkelman & Roberta Sue Alexander eds., 2012).
285. I am grateful to Andrew Hyman for highlighting the ways the early courts
adopted indiscriminate interpretations of Section 1. See, e.g., Bonds, 36 Tex. at 69-70
(declaring that "the law prohibiting such a marriage had been abrogated by the 14th
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States"); Gibson, 36 Ind. at 390, 392
(quoting the argument of [Judge] Robinson that "all the laws of this State prohibiting the
marrying of blacks and whites are abrogated by the fourteenth amendment" and noting
that the "learned attorney for the appellee has not informed us, in his brief, which one of
the clauses of the said section has had the effect to abrogate our laws prohibiting the
intermarriage of persons of the white and black races").
286. Burns, 48 Ala. 195.
287. Id. at 197-98.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 197.
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requirement.29' Saffold, however, by way of "a modus-tollens-to-
modus-ponens switch,"' 92 turned the premise on its head and
concluded that because such persons constitutionally enjoyed the full
status and privileges of citizenship, these Americans could no longer
be excluded from intermarriage with white citizens: "the persons who
acquire citizenship under [the Amendment]" could no longer "be
distinguished from the former citizens for any of the causes, or any of
the grounds, which [according to Dred Scott] previously characterized
their want of citizenship.,
293
The broad Republican judicial consensus, whether elaborated or
not, was not unanimous. It is highly probable that some Republican
judges disagreed and acted officially on this belief. The Ohio
Supreme Court, for instance, arguably implied the constitutionality of
marital segregation in its 1872 decision upholding educational
segregation.2" Moreover, the judge who upheld the statute in the
Ferguson case, decided in heavily Republican Warren County and
was probably Republican.295 A prosecution in Indianapolis probably
involved a Republican judge.296 Further, some of the Ohio judges who
291. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1559 (1870) (remarks of Maryland's Senator
George Vickers) (citing Dred Scott for the proposition that the "rights which one citizen
enjoys as a citizen of the United States" when he goes into another state include "1. To
travel into and sojourn in it. 2. To purchase and hold real estate. 3. To enter into trade and
commerce. 4. To exercise the freedom of speech, and the freedom of the press. 5. To give
testimony in court. 6. To intermarry with white persons. 7. To enter public hotels, churches,
steamboats, and other public places with white people. 8. To be exempt from all degrading
punishments.") (emphasis added); id. at 1511 (remarks of Kentucky Senator Garrett
Davis) (citing Massachusetts's colonial racial-endogamy law to show that free blacks were
not deemed citizens). Davis had made this sort of argument in 1864 as well. See supra
note 101.
292. Christopher R. Green, Unpublished Manuscript, The Original Sense of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause: Integrating Equal Citizenship, Fundamental Civil Rights,
and the Constitutional Text 18 n.23 (2013) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=1658010.
293. Burns, 48 Ala. at 198.
294. The court concluded that the privileges secured by the Fourteenth Amendment
probably included "only such privileges or immunities as are derived from, or recognized
by, the constitution of the United States. A broader interpretation opens into a field of
conjecture limitless as the range of speculative theories, and might work such limitations
of the power of the States to manage and regulate their local institutions and affairs as
were never contemplated by the amendment." State ex rel. Games v. McCann, 21 Ohio
St. 198,210 (1871).
295. I have not been able to identify this judge.
296. Editorial, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER (Tenn.), June 3, 1869, at 2, available at
http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85033395/1869-06-03/ed-l/seq-
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withheld marriage licenses were probably Republicans, though the
fact that the law threatened the issuing judge with criminal liability
hindered the judges' freedom of decision.2 97 Finally, the judges of the
North Carolina Supreme Court were nominally Republicans; still,
unlike their counterparts in Alabama and Texas, none of the justices
had remained loyal to the Union throughout the war; and none had
been Republicans before 1865.98
Conversely, however, the prevailing Republican interpretation
was shared by some Democratic judges and officials. Judge James T.
Walker, an Indiana Democrat, dismissed an indictment and declared
the local statute in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment and/or
the Civil Rights Act. 99 A judge in Kentucky reportedly found such
intermarriages valid, perhaps on constitutional grounds.3 ° In 1871,
Representative Andrew King, a Missouri Democrat, introduced an
amendment to the Constitution to prohibit interracial marriages, and
explained that the Privileges or Immunities Clause had abrogated
state racial-endogamy statutes."1
Even Tennessee's Supreme Court, which would later publish one
of the strongest anti-intermarriage opinions in American history,"
ite+marry&phrasetext=&andtext=&dateFilterType=yearRange&page=1 (noting the
prosecution of Lewis Washington). The judge was probably George H. Chapman, a Civil
War veteran and strong Republican. 1 JACOB PIATr DUNN, GREATER INDIANAPOLIS:
THE HISTORY, THE INDUSTRIES, THE INSTITUTIONS, AND THE PEOPLE OF A CITY OF
HOMES 391 (1910) (noting that Chapman served on the criminal court from 1865 through
1870).
297. An Act to Prevent the Amalgamation of the White and Colored Races, § 2, 58
Ohio Laws 6, 6 (1861) (stipulating that an officiating probate judge would be liable to
imprisonment or fine).
298. See infra note 314.
299. PASCOE, supra note 17, at 48 (stating that he found the law unconstitutional);
The News in Brief, NASHUA DAILY TELEGRAPH (N.H.), July 13, 1870, at 1, available at
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=ldsAAAAIBAJ&sjid=8KMMAAAAIBAJ&pg=
6607,3040334&dq (reporting his finding that the act was in conflict with the Civil Rights
Act).
300. PERRYSBURG JOURNAL (Ohio), Sept. 26, 1873, at 1, available at
http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn87076843/1873-09-26/ed-1/seq-/ (last visited Mar.
19, 2013) (reporting that a judge in Paducah had declared such marriages legal in
Kentucky).
301. Edward Stein, Past and Present Proposed Amendments to the United States
Constitution, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 611, 629 (2004) (noting that upon introducing the
proposed amendment, King "justified it by saying that 'the second clause of the first
section of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution deprives the States of the power
to prohibit by law the intermarriage of the white and colored races.'").
302. Bell, 66 Tenn. at 11 (asserting that even maternal incest was no "more revolting,
more to be avoided, or more unnatural" than interracial marriage).
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initially suggested that Reconstruction had abrogated the state's
intermarriage law. Writing in dictum for the court in Andrews v.
Page,"3 Justice Thomas Nelson quoted, with seeming approval, the
following remark from a contemporary treatise:
Race, color and social rank, do not appear to
constitute an impediment to marriage at common law,
nor is any such impediment now recognized in
England. But by local statutes in some of the United
States, intermarriage has been discouraged between
persons of the negro, indian and white races. With the
recent extinction of slavery, many of these laws have
passed into oblivion."
Nelson was a southern Democrat, but had remained a Union loyalist
throughout the War.0 5
IV. Post-Ratification Enforcement by Democratic Judges
In a minority of states-primarily in the upper South, and the
West-racial-endogamy laws remained in force, even before the
Slaughter-House decision. This enforcement, despite constitutional
objection, gave appellate judges in those states the opportunity to
formally decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment abrogated such
laws. Not surprisingly, judges in these states generally endorsed the
laws. Consequently, this minority of states produced the majority of
reported cases.
Nonetheless, these cases reflect a consistent partisan pattern.
Virtually none of these judges had shown any antebellum support for
either black citizenship or the Republican Party.3°0 In the South,
(unlike the Texan and Alabaman justices who nullified their state's
racial-endogamy law), 7 none of these judges had remained Union
loyalists during the Civil War. These former disloyalists included a
303. Andrews v. Page, 50 Tenn. 653 (1871).
304. Id. at 669 (quoting from JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE
DOMESTIC RELATIONS; EMBRACING HUSBAND AND WIFE, PARENT AND CHILD,
GUARDIAN AND WARD, INFANCY, AND MASTER AND SERVANT (1870)).
305. Nelson, Thomas Amos Rogers, in BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES CONGRESS, 1774-2005, at 1649 (Andrew R. Dodge & Betty K. Koed eds., 2005).
306. For probable exceptions in unreported cases, see supra text accompanying notes
294-97.
307. See supra note 273.
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federal trial judge in Georgia308 and state trial judges in Alabama,"
Virginia,31° Georgia,31' North Carolina,312 and Tennessee. The list
308. In re Hobbs, 12 F. Cas. 262 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1871) (No. 6550). Judge Erskine was a
southern Unionist but practiced law in Confederate courts during the War; a Johnson
appointee, he was remembered for interposing "the strong arm of the law in defending the
prostrate South against the usurpations of power." Judge John Erskine, in 2 ATLANTA
AND ITS BUILDERS: A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF THE GATE CITY OF THE SOUTH
647, 648 (Thomas H. Martin ed., 1902).
309. Burns, 48 Ala. at 195 (noting that the trial judge was C.F. Moulton. Moulton was
a Confederate veteran). Biographical Sketches: Judge Cleveland F. Moulton, LOOK TO
THE PAST, http://www.looktothepast.com/jacksonbios05.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2014).
310. Henrico County Court, THE DAILY STATE J. (Alexandria, Va.), Sept. 12, 1871, at
1, available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.govlccn/sn84024670/1871-09-12/ed-1/seq-1/
(noting a prosecution before Judge Minor). Judge Edmond C. Minor was a Confederate
veteran. J. R. V. Daniel, Memorials: Edmund Christian Minor, in REPORT OF THE
SIXTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 61 (Eugene
C. Massie ed., 1904).
311. Scott, 39 Ga. at 321 (indicating that the trial judge, was Judge Clarke of
Dougherty County). The judge appears to have been "James M. Clark," Clark v. Beall, 39
Ga. 533, 534 (1869) (giving this full name), who had been a special assistant to Governor
Joseph Brown during the Civil War, Samuel H. Hawkins Diary Players and Places, at
http://dlg.galileo.usg.edu/hawkins/figures.php (last visited Apr. 3, 2013). See also Anti-
Miscegenation, SEMI-WEEKLY LOUISIANIAN, Aug. 27, 1871, at 2, available at
http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83016631/1871-08-27/ed-l/seq-2/ (reporting
multiple prosecutions in the "Atlanta District Court" before "Judge Lawrence"). One of
the cases decided by Judge Lawrence was the "Hobbs" or "Hobbes" case that had been
referred first to federal Judge Erskine. In the subsequent state prosecutions, the
defendant unsuccessfully invoked also the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. I have not yet been
able to find a biography of Judge Lawrence. For more newspaper eports of the Atlanta
prosecutions before Judge Lawrence, see The District Court: The Miscegenationists on
Trial-Able Argument of Mr. Irwin-The Ku-Klux Bill Threatened, Mixed Race Studies,
http://www.mixedracestudies.org/wordpress/?p=27868http://www.mixedracestudies.org/wo
rdpress/?tag=atlanta-weekly-sun (last visited Jan. 1, 2014) (reprinting some
contemporaneous newspaper articles).
312. Hairston, 63 N.C. at 451 (identifying the trial judge as Judge Cloud). Judge John
M. Cloud had been an ardently pro-slavery slave-owner; upon ratification of the
Thirteenth Amendment, he "threatened to cowhide a neighbor if he should let his
(Cloud's) negroes know that they were free." JOSEPH GRtGOIRE DE ROULHAC
HAMILTON, RECONSTRUCTION IN NORTH CAROLINA 348 (1914).
313. Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. 287 (1871) (noting that the trial judge, from whose
decision the defendant appealed, was "M.L. Hall"). Although Judge Hall had become a
Republican sometime during the course of the war; a biography indicates he had stayed in
Tennessee after secession, but does not specify whether he ever held an office or practiced
law or otherwise had some occasion to swear an oath to the Confederate government.
Judge M. L. Hall, in SKETCHES OF PROMINENT TENNESSEANS : BIOGRAPHIES AND
RECORDS OF MANY OF THE FAMILIES WHO HAVE ATTAINED PROMINENCE IN
TENNESSEE 397, 398 (William S. Speer ed., 1888). See also Miscegenation in Knoxville,
NASHVILLE UNION AND AMERICAN, Dec. 19, 1868, at 1, available at
http://chroniclingamerica.loc.govlccn/sn85033699/1868-12-19/ed-1/seq-1/ (noting the
prosecution of John and Maria Gadshaw, and the unnamed judge's rejection of their
argument that the Civil Rights Act had secured the right of intermarriage).
[Vol. 42:2
also included the judges of the latter three states' supreme 
courts.31
When Tennessee's high court upheld its law, conspicuously absent
from the case was the Unionist Justice Nelson, the author of the
Andrews opinion,315 who had resigned months before.316 The court
was thus left with only former Confederate officers, whether military
or civilian.3"7
In Indiana, the four justices who reversed the Democratic and
Republican trial judges' holdings were not secessionists. Still, as
Indiana Democrats,318 they were nominees of a state party overtly
hostile to black citizenship and Reconstruction in general. Most
notoriously, one of the judges, John Pettit, while a United States
Senator in 1855, had called "all men are created equal" a "self-
314. The members of the Georgia Supreme Court, which decided Scott included Chief
Justice Joseph Brown and Justice Henry McCay, but not Justice Warner, who offered no
opinion. Id. at 327. Brown had been wartime Governor of Georgia and a "rabid
secessionist." JAMES COOK, THE GOVERNORS OF GEORGIA: 1754-2004, at 138 (2005).
Henry McCay had been a Confederate military officer. Henry K. M'Cay, in 2 MEMOIRS
OF GEORGIA: CONTAINING HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS OF THE STATE'S CIVIL, MILITARY,
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL INTERESTS, AND PERSONAL SKETCHES OF MANY OF
ITS PEOPLE 288 (1895). The North Carolina court, which decided Hairston, 63 N.C. at 451
and State v. Reinhardt, 63 N.C. 547 included the following five judges: Chief Justice
Richmond M. Pearson (who had remained on the court after secession), and Judges
Edwin Reade (author of the opinions, and a Confederate Senator), Robert Dick (who had
signed the state's ordinance of secession), William Rodman (a Confederate military
veteran), and Thomas Settle (likewise a Confederate veteran). Walter Clark, History of
the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in 177 N.C. 615, 624-26 (1919).
315. See supra text accompanying notes 302-305.
316. Nelson, Thomas Amos Rogers, in BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES CONGRESS, 1774-2005, at 1649 (Andrew R. Dodge & Betty K. Koed eds., 2005).
317. The judges of Tennessee's highest court, which decided Lonas, 50 Tenn. 287,
Bell, 66 Tenn. 9, and Galloway v. State (unpublished) (Tenn. 1872) included John Sneed
(author of the Lonas opinion), William Turley (author of the Bell opinion), Robert
McFarland, Alfredo Nicholson, James Deaderick, and Thomas Freeman. WILLIAM
ROBERTSON GARRETT[ & ALBERT VIRGIL GOODPASTURE, HISTORY OF TENNESSEE:
ITS PEOPLE AND ITS INSTITUTIONS FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE YEAR 1903, at
344 (1903). Sneed, Turley, and Freeman were Confederate veterans; Nicholson had been
twice imprisoned by Union authorities for supporting secession. R. Ben Brown, The
Tennessee Supreme Court During Reconstruction and Redemption, in A HISTORY OF THE
TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT 99, 123 (James W. Ely & Theodore Brown eds., 2002).
Deaderick had likewise been a secessionist, and McFarland was a Confederate veteran.
WILLIAM S. SPEER, SKETCHES OF PROMINENT TENNESSEANS: CONTAINING
BIOGRAPHIES AND RECORDS OF MANY OF THE FAMILIES WHO HAVE ATTAINED
PROMINENCE IN TENNESSEE 6, 68 (1888).
318. John Pettit, Alexander C. Downey, James L. Vorden and Samuel H. Buskirk had
been elected in the 1870 wave election that replaced the four Republican judges elected in
the Republican wave of 1864. CHARLES W. TAYLOR, BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES AND
REVIEW OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF INDIANA 48-50 (1895).
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evident lie"-a quotation roundly condemned by Lincoln.19 Senator
Pettit had also defended Indiana's anti-black-migration policy in
these inflammatory terms: "we choose to judge of the breed of dogs
we want with us. 320 As late as 1866, the party had celebrated this
policy: "That we are opposed to the repeal of the Thirteenth article of
the Constitution of Indiana prohibiting negroes and mulattoes from
settling in this State, and now, more than ever, deprecate the entrance
of that class of persons within its borders.321 And in 1870, the year of
the judges' nomination and election, the party's platform had
comprehensively denounced all of Congress' reconstruction measures
as "infamous and revolutionary.,
32
The consistent partisan pattern in Indiana and the South
suggests, but does not prove, that partisan, extra-constitutional
considerations motivated these judges' failure to invalidate racial-
endogamy laws. Nonetheless, at the very least, Democratic judges
were surely ill-disposed to provide the Amendment with a robust
interpretation.323  As the Court alleged in Brown and Loving,
opponents tended to be "antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit
of the Amendments and wished them to have the most limited
effect.
32 4
A review of the reported cases confirms this antagonism, for the
pro-endogamy interpretations did not reflect a plausible commitment
to the letter and spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment. First and
foremost, these (former) opponents of black citizenship now
effectively denied what pre-Amendment opponents of black
citizenship had once affirmed with seeming unanimity: that blacks'
enjoyment of the status and privileges of citizenship would abrogate
racial-endogamy laws.325
319. HARRY V. JAFFA, CRISIS OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED: AN INTERPRETATION OF
THE ISSUES IN THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES 314 (1959).
320. CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong, 2d sess., app. 224 (1855).
321. Democratic Platform, 1866 (Indiana), in STATE PLATFORMS OF THE TWO
DOMINANT POLITICAL PARTIES IN INDIANA, 1850-1900, at 27, 29 (1902).
322. Democratic Platform, 1870 (Ind.), in INDIANA STATE PLATFORMS, 36, 36 (1902)
(resolving that "That recent events have, more than ever, convinced us of the infamous
and revolutionary character of the reconstruction measures of Congress, and we denounce
these measures as an invasion of the sovereign and sacred rights of the people and of all
the States").
323. Not a single Democrat voted for the Amendment in Congress. MARC T. LITTLE,
THE PRODIGAL REPUBLICAN: FAITH AND POLITICS 57 (2012).
324. Loving, 388 U.S. at 9 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,489 (1954)).
325. See generally supra text accompanying notes 90-119.
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Moreover, those courts' interpretations of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause-to the extent one was offered-were
implausible. Indiana's Supreme Court disregarded not only the text
and history of the Amendment, but also the court's own precedent.
Justice Buskirk summarily rejected any issue under the Privileges or
Immunities Clause in these words: "it is quite probable that this
clause had reference to the political rights and privileges" of the
freedmen.326 This assertion was flatly inconsistent with the textual
implications of the Fourteenth Amendment's second section, as well
as the repeated assurances of proponents that the Amendment would
not secure voting rights to African Americans. Moreover, this
reading ignored an 1866 holding of the court, which had defined the
"privileges and immunities of general citizenship of the United States"
as including, inter alia, the right of free blacks to travel, reside, and
make contracts, but not including political rights.327
Somewhat less implausibly, the only federal judge to weigh in,
Georgia's John Erskine, relied on three arguments: (1) that the
Clause and the rest of Section 1 of the Amendment secured nothing
except the guaranties of the Civil Rights Act, which (he had held) did
not protect marital rights, (2) that the Clause, like its counterpart in
Article IV, was only an interstate guaranty,3 28 and (3) that the framers
of the Amendment could not have considered "marriage" to be
within the terms "privileges and immunities" because marriage has
traditionally been left to the states.329 Yet the textual and drafting
evidence is overwhelming, however, that Section 1 of the
Amendment was designed to secure (1) multiple "privileges and
immunities" and not merely the singular immunity against racial
discrimination defined in the Civil Rights Act,33° (2) which privileges
would be secured against one's home state and not just upon removal
326. Gibson, 36 Ind. at 393.
327. Smith v. Moody, 26 Ind. 299, 305-307 (1866) (emphasis in original).
328. In re Hobbs, 12 F. Cas. 262; cf. Scott, 39 Ga. at 326 (opinion of Brown, C.J.) (not
deciding any federal law claim, but stating in dicta that "the conquering people" of the
northern states "have claimed the right to dictate the terms of settlement" including
obliging us to "accord to the colored race equality of civil rights, including the ballot, with
the same protection under the laws which are afforded the white race," but "they have
neither required of us the practice of miscegenation, nor have they claimed for the colored
race, social equality with the white race").
329. In re Hobbs, 12 F. Cas. at 263-64.
330. Garrett Eps, Interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment: Two Don 'ts and Three Dos,
16 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 433, 446-48 (2007).
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to another,331 and (3) which privileges incorporated various common-
law rights, the regulation of which had been traditionally reserved to
the states, such as the rights of real property.332
The least implausible argument was set forth by Tennessee's
supreme court in Lonas v. State.333 The court (rightly, in my opinion)
declined to adopt the attorney general's sharp distinction between the
privileges protected by the Amendment from those secured under
Article IV 334 (a distinction later endorsed in Slaughter-House); this
distinction would, of course, exclude marriage from the protection of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, for "[m]arriage is in no sense a
privilege which the citizen has, as a citizen of the United States. '
Instead, the court acknowledged that the "privileges and immunities"
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment were the same general
privileges of citizenship protected in Article IV and partially
enumerated in Corfield.
36
The court concluded, however, that these privileges did not
include the right of intermarriage. The reason for this exclusion was
that racial-endogamy laws served the general good, and, as Corfield
itself had expressly said, all these rights were "subject, nevertheless, to
such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general
good of the whole."'337
This conclusion, however, reflected the judges' infidelity to the
Amendment's purpose. In assessing the "general good of the whole,"
the Tennessee court failed to adopt the very definition of "the whole"
that had been settled by the Civil War and the Fourteenth
Amendment itself. By that settlement, all persons born or
naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof-regardless of race or region-shared a common citizenship;
they were "one people" with "one country" and "one Constitution."'338
Yet in Lonas, the former Confederate judges persisted in asserting
331. KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 166 (2014).
332. See supra Part I.
333. Lonas, 50 Tenn. 287.
334. Id. at 292 (argument of Heiskell, Att'y Gen.) ("The rights of citizens of the
United States, are not the rights of citizens of States, but those political and civil rights,
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.").
335. Id. at 293.
336. Id. at 307.
337. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 551-52).
338. See supra note 18.
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otherwise: black southerners and white southerners constituted
different peoples: the "affection and fidelity in these people [when
slaves] during the late sad war should commend them to the
protection and charity of our people [and their] rights, social, civil,
political and religious, will be jealously guarded; but they must not
marry or be given in marriage with the sons and daughters of our
people.,33' Georgia's supreme court likewise distinguished the
conquered white "people" of the South from both southern blacks as
well as the "conquering people" of the North."'  As these courts
indicated, racial-endogamy laws presupposed and reinforced the
notion that whites and blacks were not common citizens, fellow
members of the same people-a notion at odds with the spirit and
letter of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, in referring to the
southern white people as "our people," the members of the Georgia
and Tennessee Supreme Court effectively disqualified themselves as
the judicial representative of all their state's citizens, black as well as
white-a posture incompatible with the republicanism impliedly
mandated by the federal and state constitutions.TM '
In sharp contrast, in addressing the Civil Rights Act, these courts
did employ persuasive arguments. Some courts relied on the
plausible claim that marriage was not a "contract" at all. 342  Others
339. Lonas, 50 Tenn. at 311 (emphasis added).
340. "The great mass of the conquering people of the States which adhered to the
Union during the late civil strife, have claimed the right to dictate the terms of settlement,
and have maintained in power those who demand that the people of the States lately in
rebellion, shall accord to the colored race equality of civil rights, including the ballot, with
the same protection under the laws which are afforded the white race, they have neither
required of us the practice of miscegenation, nor have they claimed for the colored race,
social equality with the white race. The fortunes of war have compelled us to yield to the
freedmen the legal rights above mentioned, but we have neither authorized nor legalized
the marriage relation between the races, nor have we enacted laws or placed it in the
power of the Legislature hereafter to make laws, regulating the social status, so as to
compel our people to meet the colored race on terms of social equality." Scott, 39 Ga. at
326 (emphasis added).
341. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; GA. CONST. art. I, § 26 (1868) (providing that "Laws
shall have a general operation"); TENN. CONSt. art. 1, § 1 (1870) (stipulating that "all
power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority,
and instituted for their peace, safety, and happiness" and declaring that "government [are]
instituted for the common benefit"). At oral argument in Loving, Philip Hirschkop made
a similar observation: the early cases "talk about the 'cherished southern civilization,' but
they didn't speak about the 'southern civilization' as a whole but the white civilization."
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), Oral Argument at 3, in 16 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 960,962.
342. In re Hobbs, 12 F. Cas. at 263-64 (concluding that "the institution of marriage is
not technically a contract, nor can it be said to relate to property"); Gibson, 36 Ind. at 402
(contending that marriage is "more than a mere civil contract"); Lonas, 50 Tenn. at 307-
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contended, in company with Senator Trumbull and President
Johnson, that laws against interracial marital contracts did not
interfere with African Americans' right to enter the "same" contracts
as whites, because citizens of both races were equally permitted to
marry intra-racially, and equally forbidden to marry interracially.3
Conclusion
In early 1873, the Tennessee Supreme Court reaffirmed Lonas in
two criminal cases: State v. Bell' and Galloway v. State.345  The
defendants in both cases planned to challenge their convictions
before the U.S. Supreme Court.346 Their prospective challenges
seemed promising. Both defendants had a particularly able counsel:
former Supreme Court Justice John Campbell34 -whom one
newspaper derided as "a favorite lawyer with the
miscegenationists.'348  Campbell apparently concluded, like the
Supreme Court of Alabama (his adopted home state), that racial-
endogamy laws represented an unconstitutional abridgement of the
privileges of citizenship.3 49 Like that court, Campbell probably saw
308 (holding that marriage is not "a contract, in the sense of the Constitution, which may
be 'made and enforced"').
343. Hairston, 63 N.C. at 452-53; In re Hobbs, 12 F. Cas. at 264.
344. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9.
345. Christopher R. Green, Unpublished Manuscript, The Original Sense of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause: Integrating Equal Citizenship, Fundamental Civil Rights,
and the Constitutional Text, 2013, 18 n.23, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract id=1658010 (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
346. Galloway's Bride. Nuptial's That Sent a Man and Brother to the Penitentiary. A
History of the Case That Raise a Howl in the Colored Convention, NASHVILLE UNION
AND AMERICAN, May 1, 1874, at 4, available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn
85033699/1874-05-O1/ed-1/seq-4/.
347. The Election Next Tuesday, Nashville Union and American, Nov. 1, 1874, at 1,
available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85033699/1874-11-O1/ed-1/seq-l/ (last
visited Mar. 26, 2013) (explaining Campbell's representation of Bell and Galloway).
348. Id.
349. Miscegenation: The Habeas Corpus Case of Galloway Argued in the Federal
Court: Judge Trigg to Pass Upon the Fourteenth Amendment, NASHVILLE UNION AND
AMERICAN, Nov. 7, 1874, at 4, available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn
85033699/1874-11-07/ed-1/seq-4/ (noting the argument of Campbell and co-counsel that
the Amendment guarantied the right of the races to intermarry); see also The Negro
Ultimatum, NASHVILLE UNION AND AMERICAN, Apr. 30, 1874, at 4, available at
http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85033699/1874-04-30/ed-1/seq-4/ (last visited
09/24/2013) (insisting that the right of intermarriage was an individual's "privilege as an
American citizen"). Judge Trigg dismissed the petition without specifically ruling on the
constitutional objection, but added that it "was pretty well settled" that the regulation of
marriage "belonged exclusively to the States." Habeas Corpus: Applications in Four Cases
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the implications of Taney's opinion for the Court in the Dred Scott
case (in which Campbell had personally participated)."' In Slaughter-
House, Campbell's proffered definition of these privileges seemed
broad enough to include intermarriage: "the personal and civil rights
which usage, tradition, the habits of society, written law, and the
common sentiments of people have recognized as forming the basis of
the institutions of the country.,
351
Unfortunately for the defendants, Campbell's case for his clients
in the Slaughter-House Cases got to the Supreme Court first. Relative
to Galloway, Campbell's clients in that case had a far weaker political
and legal position. Galloway was a black Union veteran, whose
actual bodily liberty was fully taken by a government dominated by
former Confederates-solely because he had exercised a traditional
privilege of citizenship-the right of intermarriage. The butchers in
Slaughter-House, in contrast, were white citizens, whose mere
economic liberty was merely impaired (not taken) by regulations
passed by a mixed-race legislature;352  further, whether such
impairment abridged any right of citizenship was dubious. If
Galloway's case had been heard first, then, it is possible that the
Republican majority on the Court would have voted to invalidate the
law under which he was imprisoned, on the ground that the law's
enforcement had abridged his constitutional privileges of citizenship.
In Slaughter-House, however, the Court's majority adopted such
a restrictive definition of the "privileges [and] immunities of citizens
of the United States," that the right to intermarry could no longer be
found in the Fourteenth Amendment. The court defined these
privileges to rights that "owe their existence to the Federal
government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws." '353 As
Argued Yesterday, NASHVILLE UNION AND AMERICAN, Nov. 10, 1874, at 3, available at
http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85033699/1874-11-10/ed-1/seq-3/ (last visited Sept.
26, 2013).
350. See supra note 98; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 493 (1857) (Campbell, J.,
concurring).
351. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 55 (argument of John Campbell and John
Quincy Adams Fellows).
352. MICHAEL A. ROSS, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS: SAMUEL FREEMAN
MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE CIVIL WAR ERA 195 (2003)
(contending that "the real reason for resistance by the white residents of New Orleans to
the slaughterhouse bill was their opposition . . . to the biracial Reconstruction
legislature").
353. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79.
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Tennessee's attorney general had already explained in Lonas,
intermarriage plainly could not satisfy this definition.354
Lower courts understood this implication. In subsequent cases,
Democratic judges in Indiana and the South highlighted Slaughter-
House as decisive precedent for rejecting challenges to racial-
endogamy laws under the Fourteenth Amendment."5  In the
following decade, prominent Republican jurists likewise affirmed the
constitutionality of such laws.356 And in 1883, a unanimous Supreme
Court not only upheld Alabama's law providing greater penalties for
interracial adultery, but suggested that the state's racial-endogamy
law-judicially revived after Reconstruction357-was likewise valid.5
Even in Ohio and Michigan, where the laws had been a dead letter
before Slaughter-House, judges permitted sporadic prosecutions to
resume, with convictions in a few cases in the 1880s.359
354. See supra text accompanying notes 334-35.
355. Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 350-54 (1874); Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. Ct. App. 263,
268-70 (1877); Ex parte Kinney, 14 F. Cas. 602, 605 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1879) (No. 7,825); State
v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 177 (1884) (holding that "the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States [are] those secured to them by the Constitution of the United States
and laws enacted in pursuance thereof" and that the right of intermarriage is not such a
privilege). See also, D. D. Shelby, The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, 3 S. L.
REV. 524, 530-31 (1874) ("It can not be successfully contended that a statute of this kind is
in conflict with [the Privileges or Immunities Clause], for there can be no doubt but that
the privileges and immunities alluded to in that clause arc only those which relate to
citizenship of the United States, and arise out of the nature and essential character of the
National Government.").
356. Bertonneau v. Bd. of Dirs. of the City Schs., 3 F. Cas. 294, 296 (C.C.D. La. 1878)
(No. 1361) (Woods, J.) (discussing with approval Judge Erskine's decision in In re Hobbs,
12 F. Cas. 262); People v. Brown, 34 Mich. 339, 340 (1876) (court opinion of Cooley, J.);
THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 229 (1880) (endorsing the "general current of judicial
decision is, that [the racial-endogamy restriction] deprives a citizen of nothing that he can
claim as a legal right, privilege, or exemption" for "the regulation discriminates no more
against one race than against the other").
357. Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190, 197 (1877) (expressly overturning Burns, 48 Ala. 195).
358. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (discussing the statute without drawing any
distinction between its provisions concerning interracial marriage from interracial
adultery). Contemporaries reported the case as upholding the ban on interracial marriage.
Legality of Laws Against Miscegenation, THE N.Y. SUN, Jan. 30, 1883, at 4, available at
http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83030272/1883-01-30/ed-1/seq-4/; OMAHA DAILY
BEE, Feb. 8, 1883, at 4, available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn99021999/
1883-02-08/ed-1/seq-4/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2014). But see A Question of Color, THE INTER
OCEAN (Chicago), Mar. 1, 1884, at 4, available at http://www.newspapers.com/newspage/
32697310/ (reporting various lawyers' opinions that the Supreme Court had not yet
decided the question).
359. Miscegenation, DUBUQUE HERALD, Aug. 13, 1882, at 3, available at
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=VqNCAAAAIBAJ&sjid=PKsMAAAAIBAJ&pg
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Slaughter-House and its progeny, of course, were by no means
the principal cause of the renewed making and enforcement of racial-
endogamy laws. These judicial decisions do not stand in isolation
from the political trends of the late 19th century. The racist and
contra-constitutional zeitgeist proved very strong, especially in the
South, and the judicial decisions exemplified the strength of the
movement.
Many jurists and citizens (especially African Americans) likewise
resisted the new trend 6° As the New York Times lamented, the
=3215,2963851&dq=miscegenation&hl=en ( oting the prosecution of "a colored man and
a white woman, both entirely respectable and worthy" under Michigan's old law" and that
the case would likely go to the Supreme Court); Mixed Marriages in Ohio, THE DAILY
DISPATCH (Richmond, Va.), Feb. 23, 1884, at 4, available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.
gov~lccn/sn84024738/1884-02-23/ed-1/seq-4/ (noting a prosecution was a test case to reject
the 1877 holding invalidating the statute); State v. Bailey, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 455
(upholding the law); Miscegenation: A Case of More Than Ordinary Importance on Trial at
Toledo, FORT WORTH DAILY GAZETTE, Mar. 3, 1884, at 7, available at http://chronicling
america.loc.govlccn/sn8606420511884-03-O3/ed-1/seq-7 (giving a fuller report of the case);
The Marriage of Whites and Blacks, NEW YORK TRIBUNE., Mar. 2, 1884, at 1, available at
http://chroniclingamerica.loc.govlccn/sn83030214/1884-03-02/ed-l/seq-l/ (explaining that
the prosecution was a case to test the law's constitutionality and that there were 100
interracial couples in Toledo living as husband and wife); A Minister in Jail, DAILY
EVENING BULL. (Maysville, Ky.), Jan, 7, 1886, at 2, available at http://chroniclingamerica.
loc.govflccn/sn87060189/1886-01-07/ed-1/seq-2/ (reporting a prosecution of an officiating
minister); Miscegenation in Ohio, THE NAT'L TRIBUNE, Jan. 14, 1886, at 8, available at
http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn82016187/1886-01-14/ed-l/seq-
8/ (last visited Jan.
1, 2014) (reporting that police in Cleveland were searching for a black groom with plans to
prosecute him "with the utmost rigor of the law").
360. CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE
POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 537 (1886) (criticizing courts for repeatedly affirming the
constitutionality of these laws; Jackson, 80 Mo. at 175-77 (indicating that the trial judge
had declared the law invalid under the Privileges or Immunities Clause); Intermarriage of
the Races, THE HIGHLAND WEEKLY NEWS, Apr. 21, 1881, at 2, available at
http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85038158/1881-04-21/ed-l/seq-
2/ (quoting with
approval an editorial in the New York Independent that such laws violated the Fourteenth
Amendment); Stewart, supra note 33, at 236 (stating that "the law in prohibiting the
marriage could not be constitutional, because it abridges the privileges of the citizen on
account of color; it denies to the colored male citizen the equal privilege and protection of
the law extended to the white male citizen-the right to marry a white woman. It also
denies the white female citizen the equal privilege and protection of the law granted the
colored female citizen-the right to marry a colored man"); The Negro Ultimatum,
NASHVILLE UNION AND AMERICAN, Apr. 30, 1874, at 4, available at http://chronicling
america.loc.gov/lccn/sn85033699/1874-04-30/ed-1/seq-4 / (reporting the Tennessee State
Colored Convention's declaration that the right to intermarry was a privilege of American
citizenship); The Black Law of Indiana; A Movement Among the Negroes to Secure Its
Repeal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1875, available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/
pdf?res=F50614FC345D1A7493C7A91782D85F418784F9 (reporting that delegates denied
any desire to intermarry with white women but that the law violated the Fourteenth
Amendment for it "circumscribes our rights as citizens"); Emigration from Virginia: A
Colored Convention in Richmond for the Promotion of this Object, N.Y. TRIBUNE, May
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decision in Slaughter-House would "greatly restrict the operation of
the fourteenth amendment, as the purpose and the effect of that
amendment have been popularly understood"; for example, inferior
courts had already "declared that laws preventing the intermarriage
of blacks and whites do not make an unconstitutional discrimination
against color, and such statutes are in force in some of the States."36'
Judge James Bradwell (husband to Myra Bradwell) charged that such
laws remained in force because the "Supreme Court is backing down
some ... as to the Fourteenth Amendment, and does not give it strict
construction."
362
Even after Slaughter-House, this minority had a few remaining
victories. By 1887, they succeeded in repealing the (largely)
unenforced statutes that remained in the Midwest and Northeast.63
Ohio's belated repeal prompted black Ohioans to celebrate the
vindication of their rights as American citizens.3"
Still, opponents of "anti-miscegenation" laws were fighting a
losing battle. After Reconstruction, each of the seven Southern states
that had repealed or judicially nullified their racial-endogamy laws
20, 1879, at 2 (reporting resolution that because of the recent decision in Kinney, 14 F. Cas.
602, Virginia can now "oppress and abridge our privileges as citizens of the State");
Arnett, supra note 162 (arguing that racial-endogamy laws "are contrary to the spirit of
the genius of our institutions and the letter of our Constitution, for it guarantees to every
citizen his equal rights, his civil rights, and allows him to enjoy the universal blessings of
manhood"); Colored Journalists Discuss the Best Road to Travel, WARSAW DAILY TIMES
(Ind.), Aug. 11, 1887, at 1, available at http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=SIZH
AAAAIBAJ&sjid=tHwMAAAAIBAJ&pg=4101,1105164&dq=maine+white+marry+l+in
termarry+I+marriage+I+intermarriage+ I+miscegenation+law&hl=en (reporting that the
National Colored Press Association denounced the legislatures of some states in passing
these laws).
361. Editorial, Jury Rights of Colored Citizens, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1879, at 4,
available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=FAOBlEF7395A137B93C
4AB178FD85F4D8784F9.
362. A Question of Color, THE INTER OCEAN (Chicago), Mar. 1, 1884, at 4, available
at http://www.newspapers.com/newspage/32697310/.
363. WALLENSTEIN, supra note 107, at 253-54. In Michigan, Democrats and
Republicans voted overwhelmingly for repeal. FOWLER, supra note 130, at 254-255. In
Ohio, Democrats generally opposed repeal, but opposition was relatively muted. Id. at
263-64.
364. Colored Citizens to Celebrate: Arrangements Made to Enthuse Over the Repeal of
the Black Laws, SPRINGFIELD DAILY REPUBLIC, Feb. 22, 1887, at 1, available at http://
chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn87076917/1887-02-22/ed-1/seq.1/ (reporting one
speaker's comment that "[w]e are now free American citizens, in possession of all those
God-given rights that belong to us as free American citizens"); THOMAS COUNTY CAT
(Kan.), Mar. 31, 1887, at 5, available at http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85032814/
1887-03-31/ed-1/seq-5/ (reporting that "the colored people in various parts of the state are
arranging to celebrate [the repeal]").
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either re-adopted or judicially revived these laws.365 In the West,
where racial-endogamy laws were increasingly common, the states
became more numerous through admission. By 1896, opposition was
so marginalized that the Supreme Court could venture to say, with a
straight face, that such laws "have been universally recognized as
within the police power of the State.
3 66
Indeed, by the 1910s, a clear majority of states now had such
laws, and opponents were fighting near-run battles to contain, not
repeal, the regime of racial endogamy.367 Congress even considered
re-adopting such a law for the District of Columbia;3 68 a bipartisan
majority in the House of Representatives passed such a ban by an
overwhelming vote of 90-8 in 1913369-one half-century after the
Republican Congress had repealed it.37°
The reasons, then, for this revival of racial-endogamy laws-this
partial nullification of the Fourteenth Amendment-were no doubt
primarily political, just as these political reasons were largely
responsible for the contemporaneous nullification of the Fifteenth
Amendment. Still, the Supreme Court's decision in the Slaughter-
House Cases surely played a significant role. The Court thereby
provided to the political zeitgeist an authoritative judicial precedent
that devastated the strongest legal argument that could be raised
against state racial-endogamy laws: that the making and enforcement
of such laws abridged a constitutional privilege of citizenship. As we
have seen, this understanding of citizenship and its privileges not only
had truly ancient roots, but had prevailed in the United States before
the Civil War, during the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and in the five years following its ratification.
365. WALLENSTEIN, supra note 107, at 253-54.
366. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 545 (1896) (emphasis added).
367. FOWLER, supra note 130, at 273-317 (discussing substantial efforts in Midwestern
and mid-Atlantic states).
368. ROBINSON, supra note 201, at 82; WALLENSTEIN, supra note 107, at 136.
369. PASCOE, supra note 17, at 167.
370. Supra text accompanying notes 180-86.
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